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!hie is not lntsnd~ct as a teobnical treatise oa any of the subject 
ma.ttell' ®Yered• nor ls it presumed that all the answers which should bave 
been considered 1n the s-e...,o'J)ening of the Newark Ai~on are here. this 
is designed. ra:bhel' to present. f:tWom a pu'bl ie relations votnt of 1J'lew an 
anal.3"s1e anci .llJ;)p:raisal. ot publ.io :tele.t1r..ns tactos-e involved tn the re-
4Pfting of the airport. 
fbe manuseri-pt has vnd.ergcme eeveftl typinglh and I am de*"'lY 
gpatetul to officials of the vari.ous government and private organiea.ttons 
wh<uh.ave so gene~elv pr$Vid&d me 'With r~l~an.t and "Oel"tinent mate:dals, 
par\1eul~l.v the ·uewazok ChambeJ:" of Comme:roe. the .National Air !trane!)ort 
Coordinating Oemmi ttee11 the l'ew York Port Anthol"i tifJQ, and the Newark 
City Govemment .. 
~ gratetnl a~reeiation to mw wife. Marjorie »abcook 3rowle,v, 
who has so paM.If>atly na.d and reread the manuscri,t and has given me the 
e~e and etimulat1on to oamp1$tion of it. 
It ls also ho~ei tbat the material ~~esented here w111 st1~1ate 
f'tU"tber J'&fleotlon oa the part ot those whose reS'Donsi'bU 1 ty 1 t ie t~r 
f'os-.el'ing the goodwill e.nd -patronage or the pub1 ic tor the &.d'irancement 
ot air commerce. 
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On Feb~ 11, 1952, atte~ the third tragic air dtsa$ter 1n the 
c1t,v of El1~abetb, New Jerse.v. within 67 Aays, the Pert of New Tork 
Autborttv ordered the immediate snspensinn of all air o~erations ~d 
aoti-vo!ties at the 'Ne~k Ai~ort. !he cloaing of the airnort becnme the 
subject of heated controve~~ among various interests and organtgatione, 
eooial, economic, and pol!ti4al. 
The :.first of the three aaeldents that led to the ai~o:rt t s 
closure occurred on December 16, 1951., when· a. Miami Airlines C..46 oonvertec 
' Ourtis Commando crashed into the heart· of Eligabeth. New Jersey, killing 
all f'ifty ... st.x persons on board, including the crew.. The second crash 
oHUl"red on JanUf!J:1!1' 22, 195:;), wheJ!i· an American Airlines two..-eaglned Con .. 
va.ir, attempti~ to make an instrument landing 1n inclement weathe~. 
crashed into two homes 1n the residential section of EU.mal>eth, killing 
all tte passengers, among them Ex·Assistant Secretary of War Rebert 
Patte~son and six tenants ~t the ato~ementioned homes. the third crash 
occurred on Februai'Y 11, 1952, when a National Airlines plane, plunged 
in llllimabeth into an apartment house killing 4 tenants, twenty-six 
passenge7s iaclu.dlng the orew, and injuring torty .... four, mostlv passengers 
of the plane. In all the three accidents. one hundred and nineteen 
pet'sons lost their lives. 
Wine montha later. on November 15, 1952, notwithstanding public 
demand to have the airport closed permanently or moved to another locatio~ 
the airport was ordf.ll"ed r~epent!Jd and £17ing operations renmed. on fUll 
seale again • 
2. 




The re-opening of 11he N~ AilfPOl't pt''s~nted a 'Pl'Oblem in 
J)tlbU.Q ~'la:UQns which b1Yol~d net only facto)!~$ of safe operations* 
'bu.t also the human element and the eeonomic welfare of the commtUli ty • 
lt is the 'Plll"P06Hil of this paper to evaluate and an&lyme, from 
' ' 
the po;"blic relations point of view. the methodG, prG'Oed.vee. tltltd 
teohn1ques utilised in. the ~opening of the Bewa.rlt AiJ'P()rt. An att~~. 
is futher made to present a s$rles of reeommendatiens for ( 1) the 
'Ultimate reconciliation of all pu.'blies in.voln~the comm~ity• the 
residentiar,v public, and the economic interests within the vicinity ~ 
the ai;rpcn•'b, and ( 2) the ree.sB\lt'ance given t• l!llisa.beth and conti~ 
' ' 
reeia.ents that all steps within human eognieaade have been undertaken . 
to seeure the satew of all oonee~ea~ 
lt is ~ther desired 1lo. make this a hel:Phl stua,- which may 
be applied to like or similar situations occurring elseWhere • 
. . 
'.l. ..... 
~ _.__ n ----
WBl!l NEWARK Atle'OR'l' 
the Newark Ai~port !a si~ted in the state of New Jers~ b~t~een 
40 degrees so• & 461l latitude and longitU:~ ?4 depees oo• & 15& t 
app~o:a:lmately e miles fJ>om New 'fork on the Polaski overhead· highwa-Y; 
'O'ni ted States ,oute 1. It ts abtt'l1t one and one .... halt mU.et:t south-
east of the rrmbt 'bad.ness district of Newark, New J&rSe'/1• Exits from 
the Po.lasld highwq make the afrport· most accessible to the motoJ;"ist (l) ' 
and the pedestrian~ 
Const%'1J..Ction was started in 1928 anci it was o:t:f'lciall? onened 
(2) 
to air mail service on September 15,.1929. Whe post office denartment 
.• 
furnished facilities and pe!"sonnel to handle all airmail. tJ!he o"eni.ng 
axpec.U.ted the delivery ot mail to the metropolitan area. Prior to this 
al.l at:rma.il had to Journey overland. to the city from Jrunswiok* New 
Jeree,v. the terminal in use at that time~ !his change of destinations 
in the New York area certainly facllttated all deliveries of a.trma.U 
9.'he original runwa.rs were North ... South $lid East-West... '!hey were 
ot sufficien• length to a.ccnmodate the ~lanes of that ~eriod. Oolonlal 
Lines were the civilian operators of the contract airmail service from 
:Boston to New York 0it3"• They also t.mera.ted the service to .Allrpy,. New 
(1) "Newark•" Encttelc'Qedta. Amerio<m!* Vol.XX, p. 25"1. 
(a) Civil, Aeronautics At~o:rts Division. !J!;lltatin, (Wanhingtont 
·· lJove~nment Printing tfflce, 1952)., t:J. 4. 
i 
-- I __ _;;;. ___ ...:_- _.::__:_ 
- 1f; ... 
'fettle, Montreal and otheJ" parte of Canada. The mall squth to Washington 
to Atlanta. and all 'POints west. use~ the Newark Ai~or'\h A shuttle 
senri~e from Newark to lbu.nswiett, Wew 3e'I'Sey, connected with matl planes 
flo PU}tsburg a.nd Cleveland with the mail planes west to Chicago to 
' . ' . . 
Oallfom!a; a.nd all intermediate poblts. 
Whe tif'st passengers weJ"e (W"ried by 1ndivtdua1 chal"ter ~lanes 
ina.~a\ed the ttret paeeeng~ se~1ae between Newark and »oeton, 
Ma.ssachusettsa utiU.ei~ the tri ... motored J'oJ!'d airplane to that end. 
Dvtng the intervening ,-ear·s. various companies started. passenger 
ee:rvice f;o the sout.h and weet. ~onne"ting wlth intel'media.te points. As 
aviation pJ.topessed., airl'>lanes and facilities ket,>t a.'brHst with the air 
devel<Jpment and grew to meat th!il demands ot air travel • 
.By leaps and bou.nde and with the _aid of government subsidies, 
a.!mail• and looe.l ft.naacisl assistanoe, the abport grew in sitae and 
p.restige. It kept pace with aeronautical cle1felO"Pments of 1ndustey and 
tranaporte.tio~ Ul'ltll the seQoncl Wol-'14 W'M*. lecognlzlng the advantages 
d~fensively and offens1velty to the a1n>lue and. the need of ttn-to...date 
ltasea fof' its utilie!lation the Ail" Jfo'.fos ha4 occasion \o aoquire the at• ... 
'o~t for its use. 
the t.hlltled States .Aitr Fetrt.te made e.nansementus to oocm.:nr the po-bt. 
f!ft Wewal"k ilogeth&tt' with the airpori and ell f'aoU f.U.ea to fUrther its 
reeef.ve. and wocee~:h a!ri"orce su-m>l iea, at:r~'lanea and et;ttd:pment for uee. 
of' tJni ted States tro&J)s ill ovel!'eeas assignments. 'both in Euro-pean and 
• 
• 
Asiatte theater commands .. 
·At tht~ peak of the war, the Atlantie OVeroeas ,command "Pl'OCes~ed 
for shipment o~&P lOOO aireraft .pe~ month., plus the accomn~ing eo~ 
plement of eul)J)lies as need~d bF ovevseas ool'lmlall~s to win the war. 
!hee$ abov~mentioned su~plieo utilige4 the port water. PJnd harbor tacilitt e 
to direct!~ sb~p b.1 tanker through the adJoining port ot New York~ The 
port of :Newark was ideally loeated for the fast shtnment of parte. ete. • 
which al'f'i?ed and were qu.iokly and $l)eecUly transfened tFOm rall to 
. . 
advantage, whethel" fo-:t -peaoe ot- war pmwpeses. made the Newark Airpo~ 
an econom1-e asset to the oa!!JJinlljity .. 
With the cessation of hostilities, the demands ot business for 
the commercial use of the Newark Airvort wePe aeoeded·to b.Y the' Aft ~orce 
· tJyon return of the at}mort and its t"ao111t1es to t'he oity of 
Newark, the pbvaleal l~out of the field oomprieed three well-develo~ed, 
etftoient. modeft equipped J'UWays ready .for the immediate use of the 
airlines. fhe ~w~s were Wo~~~Southt Eas~Westr No~th•East; ani 
Soutb ... West-. !he latter. the No!'tll-lDaeit-Scmth Wee' wae the instrument 
runwq .• and was utilb:e& to'l' all landing$ when weather conditions and 
visibility p:rohibi'ted usual or eontaot flying. 'Phis runwq had eve'ey' 
know device and aid wha~..,. the neeass~-!7 asslste.ce was given to the 
~illbt to tnsure his landi!lg sa.fe1'1J', which 4one1sted of aa t~. s. 
(Instrument Landing Sy-stem) and a 4 .. S.A. (Gft1lltc1 Control A'P'O!."Oaeh).. 'Rhe 
InetrU!l)ent Le.nd.tng ~atem we augment~ b7 the t-adar sco'J')e whe:teby the 
control tower gave ve~bal lnstraetio•e to the pilot to aid him in 
-, .... 
. . 
height, distance~ weather and vtslbilit,- from the run~. &round Control 
Approach is aecomplished enti~&ly ~ radar obs~rv.ati~ns of the ~lane 
. .. . . (3) 
from the tower control bJ two-~ ~adto. 
Ia add.i'U.on, th$re was installed by the Abf'()\'C& a high voltage 
frequency U.ghttng d.1re,tiona1 aid tosether w~th neon apnroach lights 
to the end of the run~ to imple~ent the safety facto~ during the 
l.a.nd!ng B11Pl'oath.; !he majority ot pU.ots. when. q,~estione4-. wer~ of the 
oninlon that. Newark Atrpor\ po~seesed one of the ~e~t landing_lnstrument 
J'\Ulwqs in the eouatrr~ (~he author can tes:tify to ·tts ttualifioati~ns 
'by his own personal experienuet having had oocasio~ to use it several 
time$• when 9tattone8. there dving tbe war• Yisi'btlit:T being "Ve'l!l/ lo._. 
to ~tere.) 
ly 1952 the Newark te~min&l was a be~h1~~ of aviation tndustrtal 
aett•tty, economically• ~oliticall?a and socially, with all of the modern 
ta~il1~1es fo~ the needs of eucoeaetul atr t~anspo,~ton~ 
Wewark, ·by 1ceatton, was ideal. gaogra~httall~• teChQtcally dftd, 
' ' . ' . 
the oth~t publlc~. 
!'rom the aviation aspect. Newark had evelW k.no~ and mode.rn ai.l* 
' '• 
!la'Vigation aids, eonmnm.icatl...,n facilities, vteual· '{)il~t aids. In faet,. 
from the standpoint olt sattrt~. 'lewark J:e:nks among the leadtU"ta. It hAe 
an up... to--date complete wea.th er for.aoast.ing s\a,tion plus the usual radio 
mge and radar components. 
(I) Jer~e Lederer• •Notem em l:'irpoi-t Safe~ttFtig;tlt ·Safet:9' ll'oundation, 
!ne,.. AdilJiee.e deliVered befo~e the AOG·, :Los Angeles, Oalttornia., 
March 21, 1952. 
Its ~efmitt.al. buUdings, shops, restaurants and the 1 ike a'J"e of 
the best. Ita prcximity to rail. bus and road travel is without eomnetl• 
finds the convdnient air transportation ot its products an economic asset 
in competitive markets* 
!t must 'be elearly aotecl' that prior to the bUilding ot New Yol'k•s 
L~a ail'f'ie14 within the eonfln$:S ot the city• this pioneer a.irpoFt 
"Was rated one of the 'busiest in the wor>ld"' 'l?he ma,Jol" airlines-. Ea.ste""• 
United1 Amerlean1 ~s-Wo~ld Airlines, and Rational• are housed there 
and da11~ operate. 
It is true that the instrument apnroaeb nnway to the airport 
neoessitated low flying dtreetly over ~e city of 111zabeth1s main 
business and residenti$1 sections~ ~ng inolement weather conditions. 
the wind blows practically from a Northeast direction: consequentlY as 
])lanes land tnt& the wb.d. this Jl'eqtd%'&4 an appl,'oach ovef' the heart of 
Elbabeth.. Rowavet-,. at the time, the J.irport was eondds:red 'by a'll as 
• 
fhe bulk: of thlu enrployment ttems t~cm a.eJ'Bnautioal funetionst 
traff:l.e, flight, mainten&l).ce and gr-ound l)et!sonnel,. '!he Stemainder re ... 
p:t-esents enrpleymen.t through related aot1rtties, such as gl'OtUJ.cl trans-
porta.tion se"ice. «oneeasio:ns .• fedel"al· government units. buildings and 
peund.s.. l.fhe tQtal p~oll, a1f':J,ine,and non•ai!l'ltnes for persons 
employed at the aii'J)ort d:u.?1ng 1951 is estimated at $11.,365.000,. 
Airport emplo;vment is. stable tn vol'll!lle, anti an-pears to be relat1v ly 
unaffected by seasonal swings tm air traftte. During 1951, employment 
reached a low et 2.m and a htp of 2,406 .. 
Over- 8.3~ ot Newal"k personnel treside in New Jersey. Most of them 
make their homes tn liwlsotl, ~ 'Union; and Passta.a couties and a 
consid.et>a'ble n•.un"ber 1n Monts, Middlesex and Mo:runouth .eotUJ.ties,. 
boundaries o:t. th~ fi'tirport .,noemises. H~tel O"'el*a.tors_ in large!" cities o'l 
Northern Wew lersey estimate that trom 10 to 20~ of their receipts 
originate· from flight crewe ana transien-ts entering the· area 'b7 way of 
Wet<~ark Ail"Port, This 'Pei"Centage is large eilOugh to eff'ect hotel em-
plo1M6nt as the business 'V'OlUJne of food. suw11$fs* laundries and other 
establishments serviein.g the hotel trade. 
The 14.275,000 ~lona of"iation gasoline and oil dispensed 
during 1950 at N'ewal'k AiJll)ort, having a reta11 Ya1ue of $4. fl.o.ooo is 
. . . - (4) 
of course. reflected tn Northern New Jet*sEW• s distri'bu.ti:ag indust17. 
p O:t!J.IY, Oii' ~TA~!Sf. 
fhe cS:l!;v of Newark, the a4mlnistrative sea\ of Es~• County. ts 
the largest and most 1;)rosperous in the entiz-e etate. It has a dense 
popUlation ot 153.1 ~~aons ~er e,uare mile. As ct 1950, the ci~ls 
(4) A,n Jl!£9nsmiq.Eve1nat~q,n gf,N~w&tk Aumott• Newark Faets-l'iadug 
Committee. ('Newark, New Jersey. 1952), lh 29. 
.... 10-
1 ,04$, V59. lfewe.~lt• s 'bJ."ading area ea.te%ls to about 3, ?60, 694 •. -peopl&. 
NewlQ'k 11:'1 the terminal. ott~ to-r the following :railroader 
Penneylvaniat Central New 3ersey: llriEH l>eleware...tacka\>18Una, and Westen.; 
:Baltimore & Ohio: Hudson & Manhattan. lt ranks highest tn the number ef 
· rallroa.d-:tramcs pe,.. square mile in the l)ountry', with its average of (&) 
twenty ... six;. 
Je1tee-g Gtty, Elistletha :Bqenne, ·orange, end Patterson have a 
combined populaii!on ot 732',95Eh all within the trading perimeter. · 
Its ntae 1ocal 'banks P,oesess assets of $ 1,.053,8'13,.000 with total 
deposits Gt $ 9S0.2es.ooo.. Auto ~•ghtrations in the eity 'l'roper are 
. .. ~ . 
113,949. Man? and 'traried ind:o.stt-iee make Newark the!.r headquarters. such 
aru electrical e;opltan•es. auto -p~s, textiles, alloy wire, chemicals 
snd. the like. GeneJ"al lilleotr~c. Westinghouse. Weeton ani Western Eleetrl 
are ameng the marw mem:tfaetuers who ha"Ve main otflces located ln Newark, 
not to speak of the beet!' and beverage interests sltu.e.ted in the eity of (6) 
Newa.l'k. 
um . czn, Oli' mt.I~.AllJn§t 
!he ctty Of Eli~beth has an estimated pOpulation of app!>OXimatel 
114.500, mostly n&.ttve bol'll. 9he predominating nationalities of to1"elgn, 
extraetlon ~ l~tsh. German. Italian an~ some PeliSh an¢ Ltthuaaian. 
Xt is an 14ea.l industrial ®mmunity with its temperature a.veragt 
63 iepees F •. and the a!Ulnal. m.intall being about 14 tno~es. Asse~sed 
~luation ot the elty is estimated at $142,000.~00. 
(i) Mo!4-t'l J:!anAA!,,JJorernmen.t at'l(\ Mun.ieii!~• Mooi\V'•s t!Westors Semce 
(New York. '1953} 1 p. VS$~ ' . 
(.6) .D;!Au 'Pt 76$~ 
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!he eity propeJ' has SSG establ:tshments emplovtng 35t426 men and. 
13,267 women who t'&Oeive annual wages ave~agtng $ 801650,800.. Its 
products are valu&d at $ ~.sao,goa, ntne:f:oal of whtoh are sewing 
maehinee, oop.,er w!re, petroleum ·and products. paper pzooduete, "Printing 
presses. beds, marine aviation,· eleetrietJ"aus, generators.. t~aint and 
printing ink. 
On. the :tinaneial side of EU.aabeth. 1t has seven banks whose re. 
sources amount to $ l??,ooo.ooo a.nd. ·deposits close te $ 162.ooo,.ooo .• 
' 
fJJhere a.t"e 9 savings banks ad lean a:seoetations in the oi.t7.., 
E1iaabeth · is on the main 1 ine of the Penns7lVat!lia Railroad.. the 
l3a1 timore & Ohio, . and the 3e'l!se-y Oentrat. lt has a direct bus service 
to 'lew Yot>k. It bas two 'P:tto!linent hotels. two good-ei~ed newepe:,erJ;;, 
seven theatef'er and fol.U' adequate hos1)1tals,.. 
!he city ot lligabeth combines all the eonvenienees o~ the cit, 
with the advantages of eub\utban life.. lt h.tas a conoide,able area o't 
('1) 
beautiful ~esidentlal districts. 
'!he three air- aoeiden\s whieh.'b:rought about the 'Bewark AiFDorit•e 
Closure on febJ.ouarV 11, 195!, ar\;, 4es.cri'beil. as f'oilowst 
A. ZHE FlJ!S'! ORA~c 
In the atternoan. of' Decem\er 1&. 1951. a lfloriaa...'bound Miami 
Airlines ~lane fall flaming into the !limabeth BiveP 7 minutes afte~ 
leaving the lTewal"k A1J.iPort. All its paseenge!'s and crew. fifty...lJlx in 
(8) 
all, perished. 
The plane., a. 0....46 type. had lett the aii'J)ort eevel"al h011J'e after 
lte announced time of depe.rtve.~ lt wa.s delayed 'beeause of' repairs. '!he 
sngine burst into flames :-1ght after the tsk~otf., and it was while the 
pilot ·was tnan&ll"Ve!'itlg to land that the plane en.shed" 
!he 'burning plane came low ove:r a. h$\Vily ... 't)OJ;)ulated seotion of 
El.1sa'beth, shea.r~d 'Part of a roof of an abandoned frame duelling at 
Westfield Avenuet threw uP a shower of 'bricks as it smashed into a. foftlu 
:P'Wli.Pinl station of' the EU.-.bethtow Water t1omPe.:D7• and then d.ro<pped iato 
e. 2S...foot deep gQ].lW' where the riVal". enlv a oreek at this 'POint, flows 
between tlte old water works and a Junk¥al'-d. 
!he plane breke into :oteeee as it landed 1l!'eide down on the creek 
forming a 20-toot pyre which 'bla~e4 fiercely.. Most of the :bodies were 
bttrD.ed inside the plane bu.t some were flung into the creek which had been 
(9) Jli'Z Yort !L'imAn• 'I'f!a (New 1'os-k: '1'1mes Pub11i!hing Conrpanv. Hew York). 
Deoember 17. 19ln. -py .. lt 22., 
loe.lt.ned because it. was then rinte~. A put of the fuselage with its 
·landing wheel pointing ~ard and a sheved;..&ff wing section wezoe :re-
egniaa'ble. 
~usands of ~ersons saw the distressed plane maneuve~1ng for a 
:9laoe to land and pol tee l'eeelved moJ.Oe than ·a score ot ealls while the · 
lllane was still aloft. btlt nothing coultl 'be done about tt. 
Ra:rilly was the plane aloft when the pilot called the :fleld to'l! 
4'alea.r-ance to la."nd again, reporting Us right engine was afire. As the 
:pilot struggled with the controls trying to head 'ba.ok,. a wing fell of£. 
fhe a1rU.ner til ted at a 01"~ angle and headed in low tewal"d the rive!' 
gully. It skimmed ove!' the roof of the Alexand.e11 Hamilton H'igh School 
and crashed a few huA4tted test from the ot _. eovthou se~ 
Ottieials at the Newark Al!'J)o!'t testified during the tnvedigatio 
that the only trouble J:~e~orted. 'bY the plane pe!l'aonnel before it took off' 
wa@ that its heating system was ®t fun:ottoning 'P!'Ollerly. '!he $1U)el'V'tsin 
agent tot> the 01'111.1 Aeronautics Admintstrati(')n, •tr. Farinacci, said• ~ 
eve~, that he d~tt b~iave that 1t oauld have been the cause of the 
aeeident. 
~ee Fep$rts ~onue~ning the p1ane tn fltgbt had been made by the 
men in the towel" to the field of'ftotals. · 'Phe first message was sent 
through two minutes. aftesw it f;cak ott, then at the 'b!me with a smoking 
right e~g!ne. !be second message satd the pilot hAd t•ted to make a left 
tum in his atte7.111>t to ret'LU'n to the Air'pen. !Phe third :repo1*ti said that 
the plane had. orashei. ._ 
9fhe bJ.Yest:lgation sottght to determine whether the non .... sched111ed 
wa-r-s'UZ'J)llls airline!' wa& inepeetea properly before 111 took &tt. 
.. 1 . i. 
' ~ ~ 
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i!!t · Af6rhara"t~ei ,;!m1n&aira~tsn ,;uef4J1g;at~on R~a!.1a• 
~he p~!mar,v cause of the G.46 aireratt of the Miami Airlines 
whioh kUled all O<tett:pante· We$ motor trouble. fb.e right engine ot the 
plane oaUght on fire on the take-oft reeulting in loss of powe1' so that 
the ~1lot was not able t~ return·to the airpo~t and had.to make an 
em&!l'geney landing in the city. of Eltaa'beth, New J&"ii!ae~. o!l the 16th of 
Deoem'be:r, 1951" 
Veterrm tnveettgators f:rom the Oivil ··Aerot'U!'Autios Board searoh$4 
thl"'ough. the tqeo1:r.mge. tJ;7'ing t~ aseertain the -use. of the tat! ure Gf the 
right engine... Accotoding to the t"e"port thet>e. were M'l'le lndtca.tlons nrior 
to the take--oft that the right ml!ttor wa~ not tunotion~ng eo!'!"ectly, even 
though the log "Showed. that the plane had 4tts1 bad a required l'Jariodio 
inspection as prescribed ~ QiYil Aero~tias Administration regulations. 
One such incUoation o1ted. by 'bhe re~or-t was that 11 the right 
engine required twie.e as mu:ch o11 ata the lett" at the time 1 t was serTice 
a\ Newark b,v the llne c~w. Another slgn was the p~eaenee of fresh oil 
. ' . 
on the cowl fla!)a. Ibis. all eho'1idd have been notieed. by the crew during 
the -pre..fl.tght inspection. '!he fresh oil smear should have definitely 
suggested: the !leed :tor a thorough ~e·et!on.·• to ''determine' Us. source be. 
.. 
fore ruthe:v·opettatton .. 
Recmnet~ctl.~g the flight the O:tvll Aennauttos :Boas-d. re1)ort 
said that· Bwnbe~ lo qttntar on the rlgbt. motor blew out and raw gaso11n~ 
which normally was fed into tt tor •ontrolle& combustion burned freely 
in the o-pen af.tt. 
Fe.11.1k .~~?,ntg~nst Jetmt 
'lttm\Sl' 10 ql tnd~ failed whe:a bold QWJl studs O:P bolt gave Vla:f 
trom fatigue. "olwtousq. these nuts had be$!1 imp~opevly installed." 
,. 
•'18·,..;; 
Studs on Numbe~ 14 :tailed for the sam~ reason, namely fatigue. 
In addition. a.d.'ittae trom the chtet pilot ou the· ground. did not 
help matt&ll"St relay~d·\y the tow~ radto. rltld. may ha"''e caused even moJ'.a 
treuble.. Due to smoke ~ '£:rJ~.em the l!'ight landing gea:r we1l* the 
auggestton was mad& that the gear be dropped. to "!'lnt out the fire,. This 
set,. on. had. the tteV6'l'Se effect· o-f slowing dOwn the 1>lene b7 re~c1ng its 
tWeed on take-tit with a fla11 load, as ,.evealed by' stl'bseqo.ent examina.t1ou 
. ' 
· 'lb.e collelueion was that ta.Ulv maintenan~e was to blame for the 
accident.. Likewise. the o:fflc!al report ·chl:utged the o-perato~>, ~Ua.mi 
Alr:U.nes, !nth• wltb o'!f~loading the plene and chaf'ged ite pilot 
·(9) 
training program in eme!'genq pJ!'oeed:ares as being inadeqtlaile.., 
... 16. 
lf,rT!ffil SECOI'-TD CRASH; 
In the afternnon of JanuaJ? 23, l96a. an American Airlines twin• 
englned. Convair Liner OU'J71ng 23 pe':V'aGns inel uding the crew m-ashed t:n ... 
. . . 
to a resittsntia.l seetion of Eliaa'beth. kUling all its paaeengere, amcq.g 
them Jb...Asaistant Se&"etary of War Robert Pattetoson and six tenants in 
homes hit 'by the plane·, 
When the plane hit the houses, U: sheared the roof and u:pper 
floor from a three..stery" briek bulld.ing near the corner, and d.emoliehed 
a. two-story converted garage .just 'back ot the structo.:te and set flr& to 
(10) 
a. white cattage next to the brick house~ 
The pilot was in Gra.l contact with the lfewark A~ort tour 
minutes 'b$lore the plane vashed. He was o'f'er Lind$n. New Jersey at the 
time,. end was flying on a northeast d1l"ecM.on for a landing, with a 
ceiling of only 400 teet and with a vts1bil1ty ot less than thre~fo..-th 
ot a mile. trp to 3t41 P,M,. the pilot was 1n to'O.Oh with the gromut conpo 
9f's11em at the Abtpor\, 'but a second latel"• the planets image vanished. 
Details ot the la8t moments of the plane wer$& (1) that at 3038 
the radar oantrol operator aSked the pilot Whether the messages from the 
eontrcl towet- were coming in clearly,. !he pilet answeJted that they woe 
loud and clear... !he eontl'ol tower relqed orders that the plane, 'Numbao 
$'180, was cleued for an ~Na.ch on :t"U.WQ" lfwribe1" e. The message also 
inf'ormea. that the rad.ar advisoJ!F would. 'be furnished the !)lane for 
.. 
.... 1? --
Xnstrwnent X.ead1ng srstem on the looaliaed f"fluenoy whieh was 110.3 
mega.qolee. !!he X!!wark raae.r control towe~· had identified the 'Plane on 
the precision airport radar seaoe while it was app~o:imately 3 miles 
south of Linden, which is 9 miles aouth of the airport. !he pilot 
a.mowled.ge& this transmission;, 
At tiw miles aw&V from the Airport, the plane was on the glide 
path and 900 fe~HJ lef't of the course.. At 4t miles. the Newark raa.to 
operator reported to the pilots «Ooming back on oo~se 400 feet to lett 
Of glide path ~oa-a At 4 miles. the ra4lo o~~tor CAlled him again 
sncl. eaid. *SOO feet left and coming back on oourset" then hie next 
message advised the pUot he Yae on a oeurse and 100 feet 0!1 the glide 
path with the courthouse 1 mile ahead. At 4 mtlet out the· radio 
opentor sent the messagel " Drifting 900 teet to the right ot the course 
if# a. mile trom the eovthcu$e•* and at 3t44 P.M., he :t'ePOl*ted tha.t the 
plane hacl disappeared tJ>om the ratle.r ec~e. In a 'taw seconds or so. the 
plane craShed .. 
All witnesses* otttot.als e.i'ltl ctT1i1ans alike, agreed that the 
plane's tanks mast have exploded at the moment of im-pact with the houses. 
*!hey tt~stitiad tha.t .. flames shot high .fJOom the damaged .. truotures with 
simultaaeoustl'*apl'd ep:r-eacl of the :rtr~ari.ng fires~ 
··r: 
Witnesses wel'e U\ sure of the angle of descent. but firemen 'be. 
. . . ' ' . . 
lf ..eTed it nm.st. have come down at a steep angle, its 90 feet length and 
74 tt:ot wing span almost completely covering the three etruct'tll"es •. ., .. IJ!he 
weclmge was too baret to reooe;nt~ except fo'l.* one engine .1ust oU.tsicle 
the brick apaJ>tmea.t house .. 
9?he plane,. it was e'\ttl~, attempted to make an instru.ment landin! 
through rain and fog whil~ being monitored on survelllance radar sets. 
• 
f.lhts ayetem was designed te. permit a pilot to see whether he is 
<m the pro'Pel" anprovec:\ "Path to an atrport by watching two needles in an 
tncl:tcato•.,. One needle shows the pU.ot whether be ts 1 bed ... up cor'rect17 
with the runw., ·and the other ia supposed to indicate to him whether he 
is on the PJ"trP&r g1 td.e path• not too high Ol* too low at ~ trpecifted 
moment. 
Another landing system, gttou.tid ·control fip-proach (C,O.A~) was 
available bu.t was not being used"' in this s;rstem a controller on the 
ground watches hts ·radar set)-pee and talks the :pilot in _. telling him 
oveJ~ twe...:way ratio exactly where he is and what to do to land without 
di~flculty. 
Ci;rit .Acronatltica .t;§ministrflt&on. lnyeati,gattorr- Ranarjt 
With another crash to solve, the· tn.veetigato:re were baff'led and 
bad no explanation to offer that could affix on ·e:n:; one faeto:r. The only 
cenJectare that the accident snee1a11sts have to suggest attar months of 
intensive tnveetigation. is the poaeib111ty that iee might have formed 
in one of the eubUetws in its critical decent to the FDnwaye .. 
Oarbve'tor icing,. the nemesis .of all 'Pf.lots. could. have caused 
the malf'urlctioning of the engine to account for the plane• s erratic cours 
ln the la$t mtnntes. 
'.Po sup-port this contention. the 'board. cited the -planets sudden 
yawing to the rightt its disappearance trom the radar sco~e. indicating 
a sharp swe1'1te and Ul!.f'orseen loss o"f altitude. Eye witnesses deacrlbe4 
what sounded like back•firing before it crashed. A possible field of 
speculation could be that the pilot 1nadve:rtentl7 tUJ."Jled at the Vl"Ong 
speed, causing a stall and out of control at low altitude prohibiting 
J• • •• ~,-· 
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:recovery within the time .and height limits. 
1!be etallhlg $pe&d $l)J)f'OXimately 5~ aud if the l'llot does not have that 
additional e"Oeed tor the ma:neuwr at the·moment of execution a stall 
and loss ot contr<tl results-. !be sudden surging or full power 'by the 
Cll'tb.er motozt to eoneect the s1tuatton by the "Pilot ma.v be. what the 
. (11) ' 
wi tneasee heru.-d. "loud bangs with a :roar. 0 !ehe Civil Aeronautics 
Ailministl'att«:~n tnvesttsato~s were forced to admit that .the tl'tle cause 
or eau.sea of the ora.ah have not been, as ;ret. ascertained. 
o. mtt;fl!,;Z!J!Jm .. q:RA~t 
At 12t20 A.M. ct :febnart 13t 195~. the thtH. ai1" tragedy in 
Elisabeth OCCVJ"e4 when a Natt.~nal Atr:l tne plane, OEI.t".ey'i.ng 70 ~rsons 
orashed into aa apartment house kill inc 4 tenants, .26 "Passengers tn ... 
·elu.cU.ng the orew., and lJ13urtng 44, mostly pe.ssengeJ;ts of the plane-. 
The tragetiy ocev:red with the same s~tua:re mile as the other 
crashest- '!he ~lane, a. DC..S boun& fop Miami -p).unged into the foU],"l!!.etoJI'Y 
. . . (12) . 
briek 'tndlding when most of' the fllsi4ents w•e fast asleep'~ 111 shea.J'ecl 
ott halt a floor et the building,· struCk some trees, then craShed. !he 
c,_a.sh lit the stdes tel" m!les al"'und.., Passengers sitting 1n the rear ot 
., ' 
plosions in the nlane and the bntlding ser1Gusly hampered rescu.e t-forkers 
plane ba~"ely m£ssed the taaet Memorial Home at '00 Salem Avenu.e, en 
institution fo1!' children ot broken homeo.. This G1J'Phanage heme houses 48 
cl41dt'en and 12 adults. 
Afte• the plane hit the a~artment house •. 1~cated in a fashionable 
't'ee16.en.tia1 eeotlOR of the Git3" of l!ll.iee."beth, two sections ot it landed 
in the pl~ground of the eh11dl"en•s home. 
Investigations disclosed that the ~lane c~shed two minutes after 
iii took off from Newattk Airl)ort an.d had been f.n trouble practically frmn 
the in~:rbant its wheels l~t the FtUlW&V• !he weathef' had nothing to de 
with the crash, as it was a eleB.r', moo1a:liii night, 
A l'ecord of the plane's tek•ff was ae tollowet '!he pilot called 
for clearance e.t 12tl3 A.M ... and was oleBJ"ed to runWf:W li'W!lbeJ!' 24.. 7oll..clnd 
engine !'Wl•U'P• the pilot requested t·ake-ot.f' elea.ranee which was grantei .. 
' . 
'!he aircraft took off at 12tUl A-..M. One minute later the abf traffic 
controller on duty ln the tower watching the p1a.ne•s ta.Ite-otf thought it 
e.PPeared to l~se altitude. t.l!he controller then contacted the aircraft 
and asked tt ever.v~hi.ng was all right. ~he T}tlot reT~11ed tnat he had 
lest an engine, meaning that one engine was not funot!oning or world.ng 
propel'l~. !he -pilot was told~- was cletU'ed tc 1~.nd on s:aV runwq he 
wished.. He was to-ld. that he wonld ~e kept advised on the wind. then 
holding south at a miles per hour• 
The pUot evtdently could not maintain flight on the take-oft 
and the plane lost altitude until it fin$11~ cl"aShed. 
Veteran pilots pointed out that in the earlier accidents, that 
dropped deatruetton on El babeth; the pilots had los:~t eont:rol of thetr 
aircraft. They pointed out-. however. that the p1lot roele h!s ship to 
the last second ~ a manner oal'CU1ate8. to save a maximum of 'Passenger 
1 ivea. Auto matte· t'e4:0ra.tngs ot the o.ontttol tower• s oral a.treettone to 
Foster made til clear he had:,triei to get 'back on the runwav ~t$1" one 
bf his engines qutt. ~e position ot the wreckage indicates that when 
he found that it was iJll'!)ossible tc ret'tlR the plane Gil the 1"\Ulwq, he 
figured out the be~t war to hold the easuslttes to a mtnlmam. 
~&v-il AG£ottanfi,iQft A&n&n!mtnation, ~nve~ttatik'l).t 
With the marke cf two unsolved crashes nea!"blra Federal. State 
and loeal officials acted to aseertain·tbe causes of the third crash in 
5'1 days 411 ooC'Il!Ting in EliJC~a'beth. New le't'Se"¥ and also taking off trom 
the same airport~" 
Xmmei!atelv W>Cn t~etf, tlh$ pilei '!'f!ff)OSOi)ed less of oae sta.Jiio. 
board motor. ~e ptlot apparentl,- 3ettisonea. some of his ga.st~l~ne load 
prior to landing (law .,:rehfbitin.g landing with the allowable gasoline 
load to:r take-oft)* '!'his waulc1 tn~reaee his 11tt. when with a Aewnward 
motion the giant craft plunged U.to a large a'J)a1"tment house. 
O"nelu.sions ibawn were that two motors fa11ed on take-off both 
o:n the eeme side. ln?esttga'bors aheoke4 a l"t:rpo:tt that interiol' grade 
of gasoline when gassed utt. ~mother· instanoe of faulty maintenance. From 
the report i\ was l•an.ed that one ef the engines had cons14era'ble time 
(13) . . 
eince installation.. It is e; we11 known fact that <ill motoJts require 
more than the usu.el in®ectioa e.nd that att the)!' get' ald.m.t the chaneee 
. . 
engine having ~aeheA ·ae. 1 tmlt et its u.s~ult.tess and ineJ."eaaed the 
Chances of failure .. 
Xa the time element with the tension; oomple~ity of proce~ 
under stf'esa, and. 'nnilt1~11eit? of' gaageta the ~not dOes not have the 
·time to react to the ~ergenott. no"'t the 'banding all the knowl.e(lge he hae 
a'tatned with experience. 
· l t is abou' time that operet{):rs smd...cie~.d.gn,~s take cognimanoe 
of the human limitation$ $lld factOI'S· tnvolvecl ~nd make allGvanoes 
pbyei.olog!call!?' and psychologioal'!F that the human '9ilot has a chance to 
· aecomplish hie d.ut1es and reS!)onsibilities to the cargo he ca:rr1es. 
whether- paseenge~ Or" freight, end that he was trained and adjudged 
.qualified to -perfo?m. · flbe 'tnirden placed u:pon the pUot of the present 
D. IQJ!!&tr.~.~!l!~t 
It te !mpo~tant to note that the first crash ooeurred tn good 
weather, the second on a raiD?, to~ afternoon, and the third in good 
the 'Pfl!D.I'at? ea.u.se of two a4«;lttents. namel7 the flr$t and tbtra. was 
agt.ne troUble, aiits-Um.ted. therefore to faulty maintenaee.. !he causa 
~f the second erash has not as yet been ~tly determined but !ndtca,1on 
again poinil to weather and maintenance cen"tidet-at!czu;J as the prine1-pe.l 
$alsea-.. ~ere was no adverse ~ort on aa:r of t:be three crashes pointing 
to te:alty design ed l$Catlon e:r the Abtport, no~ to its control 
operations and p:roce4ul"es. 
•• 
. ~e three taraglc tJ*ae'lles whip ~oe"Qrred wt th ~he aFea et one 
. . 
. . 
which brought a oc>mbined death toll o:r 119, 'Wel'e:'1'S~"f'a4 With ind.igaatlen 
sad. contempt by :residents of lltsabeth and aaJoini.ng Vicinities. D'.fhe 
Newa~k A1JP~rt ma~t. ~e elosedpe~ently*n·wae the hue and~ heard 
(14) 
eV917Wh~e in the C.01lll'.llt.m.ities ot EU.t~~a'beth and neu'by a.-eae. 9!ho majo~i'v 
ot the people, &WfiWed by the force of emotion. and pubH.e OJ>lnlont had 
' . 
aligned themselves With certain segments ot the cornr.rrmtttes who maintained 
that the AUt-port 1l1f'a.s & C:omnl'Wltty menace. tt 
·O!t!?S~~TG ,OF .TlW l!r1.fll!K AI~Qllft 
nut the tiew 1'&1"k Port Au.thartty was Qt caught napping in mid-
s~~ l'or. ·~n befo~ the Olamo~ to have the Ai~t closed crystal!.lz 4 
t:ato an outrlgh' d.$1/land the 4&1 to11owlng the thir-d tragedy, it had ora.ew 
the· olo$tlr& &f the A;tn~l"t at 3 A .. M., February 11. 1963• ba;rely two hours 
after the crash. 'lnle .:tosnre was. however. made tor nan iniettnite period 
of time .• 0 ln. spite of this., publie react loa oontlmted. to mouth 
· Sl would 'he iatewesttng te: note 'hat "Prior te ths laab crash,. 
a ~U;p of ei1;t-m$ns boom lltewarkt l!lU.aabeth, 'Union, ltillsid$,.. and. Lindent 
had •r:t.ed. to .o'bt$in efl.denee to •o~l the l?Ol*iJ of liew York Au.theri tv to 
$top Jbe,~sion progl"am at the Ai~ort. Oa several oocaslone, 'Pl'io..-
to the crashes. a group of familfe!il stoS*llle6. the 'B&wm.fk Citv !tStl ana. 
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petitioned that ns.mmediate action 'be taken by the pubH.c officials to 
eliminate the !ioise nuisance and d.tmger from low ... fl~ing planes." Mothers 
with ba.'b1es in their arms came to give e"'1idenoe of the ter"1ble effect 
"the noise ha.d on them, together with their "PH'Perty,. and the individuals 
11viag in the glide--paths area used. by the -planee leaving and de-partiag 
t~om \he Atfport. 
When thei~ •omplalnta ~ee to fe•er p1toh, it became evident that 
a formal organization had to be set up to re~resent them before the 
authorities conoe1"nea.~ 
Shortl~ after this, the M~r•s Committe$. lneorpo~ated, was 
organi~ea... The committee was com:poaed ot l'$pl'esentati"'tes of the com-
-plaining areas and was headed by Mel'ot- Wiehola.s Sylvester LaCorte of 
Newark:. IJ.Ihe cotnm!i!te&. contlntt.ed te seeut"e 6'\'idenoes by wbloh to foree 
the closing ot the aivport. It boUght out toma.l eompl.ainte of home.. 
0Wl1&1'St eobool ~eaehe))'St hOenitals, and t"&sidente withtn the glide-path 
ana who demanded th..'i!t ••90mething 1le dtmf.l~ to etose the A111'TJcrt and move 
lti te anoth~ location.. lt likewise a.1Jpealed tc Governo!! Alfred E .. 
_,. 
:Oriscoll, ot New JePsey, to ha\f'e the- ce~ru.t.ttton. pro~am tto'l;)ped out.. 
"ight. Mqo!' James F .. KiJ'k of" Elicta.beth took oaeaeton to·ps,ofn:ttte his ci'by 
(1$) 
as one ttU».de!' an 1:1.m'irella of death .. tt · Ap-p$al.s ~~otertstie · .t these 
<paesecl f~m ttne peeen to anothert. sQall we go en, unheecUns the eo..-
seqU.tme&e of tbeee tttaged1ee, in dread. of the poeei'bU1ty ot others to 
o-~;mal Shall we 'be viotims -of mo:re hovs ot hOft'tlf'• flam• and. death, the 
terrified searehing for ohan-ed" d1$111em"be~ea. baul:tes of lova4 one~ amongsi) 
(15) m&sab~~ rloll'Dft1, (!U)b&~"t C., Cr>a.ne Publtshtng Oompe.ey-, Eli;a:beth, 
· Bew l$l"eey}. Jan~r7 ~. l'953t p,. 4 .. 
> • > 
the burned fragments of a planet Shall we eonUnue to lin "under ·~ 
1lm~ella of deathttt 
Prio~ to the last era.eh. a petition was laid. by the people of 
!lew Jersey in the hands of the State tegielat'IU"fh tt seemed. that tn 
the 'Petition. the agg!'ess1Yeness of the chosen representatives and some 
news~apers who ha4 ~~en side wtth them was outdone ~ the peo~le speak!~ 
fol' themael9$e. mver,yWhe~e. ln churches, stores, offices. factories. 
clubhouses. and streeteomere, a gt~od deal of petit1on-e!gning was 
aeco~lhhed. · !be pet1 tion 'form bo!'e an attached slip containing 
challenging questions as introducttoael 
1. If you wleh our reeo1"'d9 as the wG1l'ld * e :ftJ-st c1 ty of 
commercial d.i sas'ter- enhanced., don t t sf.gn the 'Pebi. tion. 
2. It you think we should have more than two maJor disasters 
in 37 aa,s, dontt stgn. 
3. It veu don't tblnk Elb:abeth will 'be a dead city as soon as 
the Port of' AutharU!y gets through with its buildings and 
moving Le.Gu.a.rila tG Bewa:rk, d.Gn• t sign. 
:Suo.t it you think we haw bad eno't:lgh aocdd.~nts, dea~e an& 
m-ashes that ·are damaging to the etty, if you think we have had 
enough at disaster ·to last u.s for generations. Sign Up! 
Along with this petition s1gntng theJ'e was a q_Qstteaaire dis-
tl'ibuted to Jtesldents ot afteeted. areas. Wo date. however. remtlt$ ef 
this poll S\1.'f"ltey ha'9'9 no1J been tabulated or arme1moed pu'bliely. (Samnle 
e of rett11'ned questtonna1re a'D-oea:re. in the Atrnendtx...'D) 
.·. 
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Several aviation people and ~rivate citizens launched oral and 
written e.ttac.~s on the Newark Airport O'Perations as thq were at the time 
et the tragedies end as the Port of New York Authority plans t~eJii tor the 
future. One of tbeee lashings was 'Voiced by Captain David t. .. !ehnoke,:· 
' l16)" 
fit Chicago, former president ot the Airline Pilot• s Aeeooiation.r. 
tn startling. semettmes almost tenlfying tel'lns, Captain Jetm•e 
clecl.U"ed that 1ouger and b'Stte~> l"d\fl\VS ae pr&l)osed at lfevark AirT>ert 
'will only intensify aohe a.'ld increase daager. n Be eharaoterbed e.tr-
l'()rts .sueh as Newark as ftj!g ... se.-..fittedtt ·UJ.to their eunoundlngs, com-
pletely outdatew e.nd suitable onl,. for .sehool fiying. emall plane onerattot • 
feeder airline or atr freight use and fer~? flying. OSuch fielde, 0 he eaic11 
11
.ehould be connected by air taxi servie~ to main tl"tUlk line terminals 
aw~ frem ~ensely p0pul.ated areas.n 
BeabClte 11ltew1eil m1ntaln~c1 that the impetus of wa~ttme a.1veraft 
develepment ln to~'e modern airline equ!pment1 the development &f the 
Jet and the turbo.jet.~~wered airline planes, both the runw~ pattern 
end the looattoa of the Newa:ri: Ai!"t)ort Umu.st \Uldergo a d'S"astic reo. 
e:teamina.ticm. and equall;v drastic ehenges mu~t 'be ma.de.u Re ce.lled it a 
"~oss mistake. a licentious waste of publie funds,« to add more dollars 
to the Newark AiJT~ort da.elcpments,. 
Whe f'Cl"ntel* Airline Pilot* e .Aseoo!at1on P!"eeid.ent said 0 there 
shoUld be a sound ll'llblic ~relat:S.ons progam to bring to light the rather 
close relatl~nsh!p between agencies auoh as the Yew York Por• Authority 
and the Oivil Auenauttee Admiaietmtlon Boal'd .. n Oonolucllng ftl.ther bluatlSJ ~ 
:Bmm.oke said tbat only eueb a. -progttam e~ t~O"Pe with the Dhigh.hdded me!thod ~ 
lemmon to these tvpes af ~e~•iee .. 6 
(1$) DaVid L, Jebneke, B fhe Newark 41rpoJrt and Xts ll'e!gh'boratt • llewark, 11 .. 1. 
Soucely a w~ek ette» the clO$lng of the Ail'!lort. however. a 
counter o'lamo.- to have air one.-ations resumed. l!'&Vel"bwated throughout 
fte Vl$!$1 ty fl'om va!"1oue qnal'ters of affected yabl tes, among them the 
airline employeest airline Q"&mpa.nies, b\tstness and industrial concerns, 
and even from no.,..profit os>ganisattons.. Wb.ese yublies ud.ersoored the 
., . 
fact that social and economic retl':o~ss1oa was beginning to be felt 1n 
the tomri!Uf11t1ee. Thes' maintained that· chaos and aont'us!on had began to 
wea!-t deatruetf.on: that if the clofi!Ul"e were liftecl.. it would mean eooaomio 
and social clisae.ter to the areas aff"t:tete4. Wher poiated out that the 
BewaJ'k A1!'Dort was a Vital key to the CC!)trtm11Jtit:tee prosperity and well• 
being. 
A$ a1w~a, in a questio• o• issue at stake. tbe~e a~e ~o sides 
involved.,. fhe tnt.arested parties, for and against the r~OJ)e:ntng or the 
o'J.osing ot the Ail'}lori as the premise might e;p"*-~"e l)U.t, in this ease, 
oondueted a series of OUJI'Veys. hearings, end investigations of their OWf.• 
aside trom those ooudueted b~ g&ve~ent orgsni~at1ons and ageneies. 
P:rineipals that sought the Ai~Ol't*e eventual. re ... o-pening 
were the .Newark Chamber ot Comm~. vewo:esenttag varieu.s 'business, 
industPial and COJOmel'oial establishments tn New Jerse:~ state. ~antC'Olal*lV 
~hen New lereey, and the National Air ~spol't Ooo•dina.Ung Committee 
e !'$-presenting eJ.1 leading commercial a1!•11nee in the count;ry. 
~he taction iaterestei 1n theAirpo~••s permanent elo~e was 
OOJ'Il"PPS&d of some citi~ens from l!lltaabeth and llewark and aiJotning ueaa. 
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... 21() ... 
and ~ented officially by the Mawomf: 8ommittee, tnoot"Porated. They 
eons U tute the SU'!'l.'Osedly mi:o.ori t;y gsoou.p although they re'J'l'esen t onl7 4 
out ot 100 eittzens opposed to the Atrport•s r~o~en1ng. !t 1s not to be 
inferred, however, that this groun• led by the Ma:rorat.. Committee. lneorpo ted 
is led ~ e. "Dolitiea1 ma.ehine. Rather. tM.a.,gr>(m:o ha.e talten a st&.nd. with 
the highest :ef motive-a and. as td.vi.,.minded. oi tbens inte~eted in the 
welfare or their reapeot1ve ~eaa~ 
A. R7Anrr grrAr.~mt 00 OO!~~·~OJit 
:Jil- d t j' I _.- Jj . .. . It ,.._ 
On March ll\l. 19~, the· loard. of Diraetors of the NewP-t-~ Chamber 
of Commerce anprove~ a commlt,ee ~roposal that a qneettonnQ1re be deVised 
{ 
and gent to ell Ohamber mt.mibeJ;Oe to ascertain the eoont:nnic affect of the 
(18) 
11
't'mtimely shutt'Wwn. tl 
fhe qa.eationnait'e wan destgned as. a tool to11 use in a eul"f'GY to ( 1 
d.etermf.ne the nol'!nal use of ~omme1:'t!ia1 ai~ tt1an~o:rtatton eervieea by 
" " ... 
by the r4os1ng ot the !Tewavk Airport, had had upon budness eond:a.oted in · (19) ' 
the area. · 
About 5.500 qnesttonnairee were sent to a representative cross-
section ot the cammunitu. The S\U"Vef covered va~ous types cd 'husineas 
'·; .. 
ineludtng manufacturing. wholesali~, retailing, eon~trnction. tnsnranae. 
(17) -~ .J~~ Cemm1ttee &tle&~• Newark. llw lersey, liovembel" 20, 195a, P• 1. . . 
(lS) li!J!!rk Ai'trultit Su~(lfe~ Gham'bezo ot O&mmeree, 'lewaltk, New Jersey 
. Jr:nroh. 19~. p. · H.. . · · (lt) ,~td,t a· I& · 
e· 
banking, hotel~~t transportation services· 'other than aia-, and others sueh 
as real estate and advertising. 
Findings or the surve~ revealed that the economic 1ntere~ts of 
Northern Ne~ Jeree,r mun1ot~slities were dependent npo~ the Wewark Ai~o~t. 
ttWrite-in" vo,es representing eomments on the returned tf.t1estfonna1rae ebe>WEd 
that ?3~ mai.fttainei! that the airport "shoUld be ~o-pened wt thout tt'ml !fie;.,. 
ilion"; ~- 4eelared that the e.b.•pctrt 9 should. 'be reo-pened as soon as it fie 
possible to effect s•tv measures 'bT all parties eoneemed8 and. the re-
maining 4:6 tel t that the airport 3 should remain closed and moved to 
another lQea.tton. u 
!h-e lfewat*k Ohambero <~Jf Gonuneree. t'tll'thermore. f'el t the need. of a 
aepare.te survey to be oondueted. 'by an inde'Pendent testing orgsn1Eation~ A 
few weeks after. it had eond:ncted its own, it engaged a eommlttee. known 
as the Newark f'act Finding Committee. te atu~ the economta effects of the 
~perat1on of the Wewark 4t~oJ1~ On ~~ 196~. this committee released 
its findbtgs. '!he r~ort anta1necl eome <l)f' the fa€Ste and f!€\U'es T.Jet"tilflen4 
to an evaluation of the etttinotn!e slgnifioance ~~ 'lewark Airpos-t to the 
Jlo.-thern l\Tew let"sq ... Wew York Met~'P~-1 i tsn' Area~ 'l'h.e report showed the 
\falue of the ai~ort a.s a sl!rttree of e~loymentt an eet.!mate of the annual 
l't'a,lue of the a!.I'"flort*s oper'ltion. and a ~ of the ~t.Ua• investment 
;rep.J'esented 'by tbe ·airport.. It also showed how and to what degree the 
tl'Merportation serv1~es made 'J)Oesi ble by WewPrk Airt:~ol"t are enrplo;yed in 
furthering Wew Jersey industr~ and'eommeree. 
I. !A?I<rflif•.,All\.:mbl1!-!~o~ g,oq:r,mtrrNl'RfG pm11J!IJ!Tf'&: 
'ihe 'National Air IJ.'ranspostt Coordinating Committee, made W:l of to!) 
poli(t7 executives ot the scheduled and non• scheduled airl ~.ne!'e, priv~te 
and corporate ail'•a.f~f.)Sm.en a!ld oparatol"s. and ell other el~nts of 
e. 
.otvtl aviation, meanwhile. launched a series of studies designed bo pro... 
tl\J.ce a last!ug recluetiion in the uoise caused by aireraft arriving or de-
parting from the Ail'Port. lt avra.nged for ground engine testing and r~· 
ups to be conductea.· in isolated airport areas., to OU»ta.il noise annoyance 
to those living near the aitport. At the same time, it established a earn-
plaint center th~ough whiCh reports of 91olations of esta~lished air 
~atety I'Ules and l"egul.f:~.i)t.ons oo~&e!l .. 
'the Natioru:di.Air fl'ansport Osordtnating Oomm.ittee, hoW&Ve?• was 
quick to admi\ that adjustments aeeied iu order to 'Oel'm1t the air industry 
·to maintain mwr.m1m service with a mi.ntmwn of annoyance to its ai$PPort 
neighbors, ~artieularly the eommanities, ·could not be solved ove~night; 
that a solution. muet haVe to 'be found by the anplieat:ton of the nation's 
top a'fla.tiou technieal. know-how and. the whole-hear-ted oeo"P6!'attoa ot the 
-publiQ. 
. . 
ati.optecl an eight---point pl!Og~a.m to impr<ne public safeguards and reduce 
noiBe :tnvelv~d. in the operation ot ail-oratt over potmJ.ous d.1silricts o'f 
. . . . (~) 
the congested met~politan area ot New York and adJoining vieinity. 
~he :!)ll'O~am, as it con~erned N'ewaf!k A1FPort. embraced the 
'following pointsl p~feJ"enilial x>nntfSW' system, take..o:tfs and landing pzoo-
eedu.res, training flights, engine !'Ull*'UPS on the ground. iuetallation o£ 
a two-~ ~eeo~ing equ$pment, notifi~tion of pilots, new runwsv equip. 
mente. and ethel' aew fligllt proeed.ureEh-
(20) Rfmor;t .~f ~hq ,ffaiiona.l,~~~,,~S!Ori. poord~:l1ating C~mmittee, Nay ao. 
1952~ l>- 4, 
.•'32 .... 
C., m DOOL;I~pl .QOl\~-1!SSJ.9it 
Pressure of public opinion end tnteree' of congressional leade~e 
led Pa"esident lla'rrY' s. 'l:rwnan, oa FebwatT 20, 1982, ·to a1'l)o1nt a 
commission to etud.y the problems of al:roo:rt safety. Under the chai!'Rlal'41)hil 
'01 Lieutenant General James u. Doolittle, the commission, eom~oaed of ...,.. 
perts in their reepeetl?e f'ields et aViatio-n, undf)lltook an tntendve stu.dr 
' ' ' (I!) 
ot al.l aspects of fiviation that had a ·lJear-ing on the airpoX't· problem. 
Whe Doolittle u~mmis.slon etamined the record and coneul.ted with individual! 
ud organiaatlons concerned with civil and milita1.7 aeJ"onautios and. air-
port management. It collected.· oomp1led, and anal1{!!ed the vi~e and 
~inions of some 75 muni•lpal govefnments of United States cities on the 
past, :present, and 'futare ot the ab'poris tn their commtmities. visited 
30 ot the major ail"J)orte of the CG'Wl'b:ir and contenea with thei:r local 
., 
~or1ties.. It also obtained the view$ of e1vie associations J"$iJl'lf16nting 
pi:~ople who lift t.n the 1'icinit~ 1/).f airports 'but are not otherwise related . 
to the aviation industry. 
!he Oomm1ssion fG'lUld out tha\ some ~f thee$ groups wel"e ou.tspoken 
in thei!" desire to be relieved eatirely of' the n~t.s~nee anti ezpo~ure to 
potential ~hamrd "Wl ting fl'om ai'rol"aft operations in their viotni tv • 
'l'ha majority, how~. were tnOre rnodeJtate ln theb.' views, this 'biggw 
segment ~eeognbd that aeronau\tos !e an e'ssential $lament in the nation's 
eeono~: they asked t>nl~ that 0a11 possible ·at~s "be taken to m1ntm1ae 
{21) 
nuisanoe and ha~ard~ n 
( m.) •fne .u~art and Its Netghbo!'e., •- ltf"'lg.rt ,of , t~Et .. ~res1zen1j 1 s A!nnu:t 
Oem.m&t~s~9n (Washington: Govetmment Printing Of'fiee, Mar 1611 1952). 
'PP• , ... -.u. 
!lte 0Qmmhai'on f'otmd that potential danger to "People on the 
gJ"Oun4 is confined almost entlrelf to the ax>eas at ·\he end. o£ the airport 
:rtlll~e; that to mtn1m1sae this ba21e.rd existins airports shoUld gradually 
~nt:rate the11" ~f'to ()n one or- two -parallel rtU!Wa.Yfh ·!he commission 
also urged that new atrpo~ts be built on the single o~ parallel runw~ 
pattern incerpo,.a.ting cleared uea.s a half-mile long and. 1,000 feet w:ld.e 
a~ the end of' each. runwq, with ttfO.oomile-long aP"O:roachee beyond theee 
-extensiens, monecl to lteep out any eoncentrati!l)ns of' 'PG0'Dle, or construct1or (2a) · 
of buildings .. 
Speaif'1ee.lly, some of the aS'Peots of the airpot"t -problem and its· 
safety as it applies to the M$wark ~o~t1 .eons!derei by the Doolittle 
Ocmmission, were the ~&llowingt 
1. A!.GSrt &rl!'dll -.. Manu ail'Ports ue &'P'Proaohing saturation. 
A considerable aum'ber of them are \ail7 «out of 'balance" due to defloieuey 
in o~ f.IP another ttt theit- faeilities. !hie is -paJOti~lJ' true with 
some of the la~g$ muntot~ a!fPo~ts Wht~h now have trafflo eontrol 
«apabtlities '!)~itting a grea.t maay landings ancl ta.ke.offs 'PSI' hour 'but 
whose runwa.vs and serv!clng :f'e.en i ties on the ground haft not 'been kemt 
apaoe with sueh dlan$e'h It woulcl not be Justified. therefore. to 
OlassU, the 'Bewastk ld.rpo!'t · unde!' this eategoJ'Y stnee prtor to the 
tragedies, the oon,t"1 tower and the pUOt& never 1'$pOJ'ted iJ.iffieulties 
h the matter of le.rul.!ng and ~otfs. 'l'he fol'ltler 1"Ullwaye were eon-.. 
sidered adequate uade,r all flying conditions,. 
... ~-
8.. t,1il i tsl!% .. ~a t!Av1J, ian Qnemtlgn "".,. Airpo:vt use becomes more 
complicated when there is Aot.nt· use by civil aviation and the armed 
serVices.. !his oe~tainl$' ~.a' not oondui"Te to idaat (irperation factors bu.~ 
in the interest of economy e.nd ciTil ciefense, this mq be 'Permissible,. It 
·is to be eMQhastmed, how$Ver, that full-stale militar.v eoeratione and e1 
a:v!ation on one aitmort is imJ)ract:loal. 
3. stom~itz Gno~~eehm§nt _. ~ oommonities are annroaohing an 
tmcasse arising from limitations to safe o~erat!ons on esl~ting airports 
eom.'bined with J>b:7'Ed.oal inabilit~ to inrp~'te o:l' extend them because homes 
. or factories have been bttilt olose to ends of the ~ware. Xn tbe case 
Gt the Newark Ai~ort. ho~~r, this problem does not a~~l~ as evidenced 
bf the suecesetul completion of the ~ref9rentiat ran~ which Channels 
tra.f'fie e:wav hom the congested areas, particulal"ly Newark and. Elisabeth. 
4~ .!!AiRS..,. ~e fammlsston suggested two measves tn connectinn 
with 0oning 'Pttoblentlh It reeommended. (1) tl\at certain· extensions or over-
run areas be !nco!'Porated in the aiJ~~Port ·tteelt., and. (2) that larger'areas 
be,vond such extensions be BOned by ~per author1t1, not noly to ~revent 
the erection or obstructions that might be ha~mtul to aircraft, but also 
to control the ~$ett~n of pa~lie and residential bftildings aB a pro-
&eetton fltom nuisance and hamard to psople on the groUDd. J'lortuna.tel~, 
the new 'T)Pef'e:rent1Bl ~wq at the new airport -pro<vides for adeq,\late !"~·~ 
~oning tor 'T)resent and f'tttul"e erpandons. In the case ot the east-west 
7ttn~· Which is limited for uge only under oertnin condit!ons of wind 
· Yel.oei tu and: d.ireettcrn, 00n1ng is tnmossible beeau.se ~n the west td.ds 
btg buildings oeauw the areat t:~n the e:sfl1t stae is 'Newar-k :Sa_v. 
6.. f'~£~r.~ Baftis~W!O~ "'* fh& 1Joo:t1ttle COmmission S\\ggel!tEui that 
' ,,~ , .. _;. ~ 
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decried the ineffectiveness of the -program saying tht;>t there WP.s dif'£'tc,t.1. 
in eynehronidng the availability of :federal an(l local funds. This aErneot: 
or government relations whieh is a t.:~u.'blie ·relattoma <nroblem is a ~M.tter 
of extreme imnetrtanee.. Ae it a~l ieg to the Newark Ail""'&:rt* the ttmtdching 
basis" proposition is almo!'!t like ft;putting a s~re peg in a round holell 
fhe question resolves on how imnortant the city of Newal'l; and th~ Newark 
Airnort is to the national ana civil defense. from the av~atton point at 
view. 
6. t't;Qgt:r~,diflim! anf\,len~~h •• 'lhe Oommission nr-O~osed the earl~ 
aace-ptance of the single or -oa:rallel ru.nw~ design of airport, with 
app!l'oaahee ovetJ :relatively clear atteas.. 'Rhe single or- na!tallel run~ 
airnorta however, has one shortcoming. i.e •• difficulty of operation in 
strong crosswind$. But this can be o~ereome through pilot training 
techniques and the u.se o'f tricycle gears. It likewise enmbashed tho.t 
this ha!i':e.rd can be effectively uolvet\ \1 futher develo-pment of ~efisl 
cross-wind landing gear!h 
7. "Wni£tif-UQ~ fnctO:!';iJ - !his phase ot ai!'Tlort...neighbors relations 
was clearly enrphae!r:ed b1 the »oolittle eommiseiOlh IJ!he 8ommS.std.on pointeci 
out that the ~blie desetves Q cl~ explanation of neees~ary ai~ort 
t>rocedures, accompanied by ?al:id assuranaes that eveeything possible is 
being done to alleviate both noise and ha2ara., %t cited a.s an example 
that inc()ming a1l'"oratt mo.st sometimes, 1~ low visibllit?, be "sta.eked Uptl 
neu an airport under TJreeiAe traf':fie. contro'l to 'Prevent e&llisftet'lth !t 
being indoctrinated to consider 1tbe people on the ground and to make everv 
·~ ' 
effort consistent with safe flttng praatioe to ~educe hazard and noise. 
An 1ntereaf;ing though quite amusing part of the report of the 
e · 'Commission explaineJ. that aircraft desig!l.ers and rna.nufaCtUl'el"s mu. t also 
· assume a share of the noise alleviation task. lt a1id.ed. that if the 
. I 
ma1lu.fa.oturer !.a given a penalty to 'I:' high noise, or bet tar :ret, a -premium 
tor low noise level, it will ~t1mul~te comnetition in the develonmeRt of 
quieter aircraft., It is 4iff1cult. in fa.c'b~: impossible, to staudard.be 
humanity and this noise fa.etor is more or leqs a -psyohologieal factor. 
W'Mt nuw be high noise to one individual mav be low noise to another. tt 
is only to be honed that in the neat' future, soienee will be able to de.. 
termine and find the solution to the elimination of noise and nuisance 
incident to aviation activities. 
a.. g~~rQ.&!?,nt~,:,n nn~ !rasUnFt- Anethet" vital aft()e~t m the 
overall safety problem is to creat:e etand.Eutd. ba:!ning -procedures and c0~ 
pit instrument design for all e.ireraft. ~ accidents are eauaed by 
pilot e21roJ:' which oan be ~eatly reduced bU' the above ... menttoned fe.otors .. 
'rhe complexity of the mode:rn airplane is now practically beyond 
the limitation of the human element, psychologically and plJYs1ologically,. 
In the A:?rilt 1952 issue of lroJ'tune, this co~lexiey is underscoredt 
u A meohanie duri~ Wo:rld War- II could. kee-p the electrical system in his 
head and take care of the engine e.t the f'lame time., Now it takes an 
electronics specialist with years of be.okgro\J!li in radio and radar to kee-p 
the Sabre Jet• s electrical system in tun.e .. n An r ... ea, fer ~ple, has 
49~ vacuum tubes a'board, aa things .to1! a pilot to !J't1ah, touah. turn, 'PUll. 
or othemse operate. and at least 100 othexo signals, dials. and in,... 
4iCatO%'S tO wat4h (all th1s in Q single motoJ"ed "0\U"SUit Tllane.) 'fbis 
I 
,. 
eitw;.tion :is multiplied 1n multi .. engine planes, of different tyoes ~d 
m.a.kes, a.ud with ditferent oon~rol and operation systems.. The :&.36' bombPt."t 
tor e-xample. carries 2,143 va.mm.m tubes • 
. This complexity and multiplicity of instruments is most evident 
when the pilot is confronted by an emergency. No ·m$tter how experienced 
a ~ilot ~ be. t~e element of time does not allow him to utilize the 
measures neaessar,y for the protection of passengers and equipment. It is 
to be regretted. therefore, that manu.facturers and designers of ai.rcr~ft 
tod.Fq have given ever-em:ohasie on gadgets and tnetrument.a of' the l)lan.e, 
and. in ~heir desire tor highezt nerformRnoe have neglected to make certain. 
allowBncee for t-he p}Wrd.ologieal 1 imitations of the nilot .. 
Even as discussions end deliberations regarding the problem were 
in full swing. the l!fewa:rk Ait"P01't was t>e.-opened. on June 16, 1952, by the 
Port of New York Autho~ity to the Ar.my A1~ •oraes and for ltmtted. use ~ 
(23) 
the ~ommere!al atr11nes. ~&Cause of the rigid regulations that were set 
u:p by the airlines. the Oivll Aeronautics Administration, and the Port 
Authority, lese than 10~ .of' the nlanes ma.de use o'f the Airnort· as com .... 
p&JI'ed with the normal number of planes that used it nrtor to the llll.ima.beth 
erashes.. 'lhe origiul 2."Qf1WS7 identified with the- thl'ee crashes was used 
in limited sealer the remain~ng ilwo were utilised according to wind. direct n 
and veloclt.v and weather conditions. 
Whe economi-c S'111'Ve1 cozulucted at the instance of the Newark 
Ohambe:r tlf Commerce, the etgb:b point program offered 'br the National Air 
Transport Ol~ltnating Committee, and the findings and recommendations 
ot the Doolittle Commission sppea~ed to have merged all interests into a 
powe~ul bloc that br•USht pressure to bear fo~ the interest of the entt~e 
metro'PoH.tan area ot Bew Jersey,. IJ!he issue no longq revolved, tt seemed, 
en the zoe....ope:ning of the Airport, but upon full and complete resumntion 
ot operations, since all safety factors involved in the olost~g had been 
satisfied. 
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On November 15• 1952t the liewark A1;rpo:rt resumed full and compl.&te 
(24) 
Op$ra\icms.. !he Ql.imitea. u.se of 'tihe airport tor civilian and millt.., 
services was effected by the completion of e. new and. -preferential runwq 
e a.s l"SC0111Mended by the genetJal findings of the »oG1ittle Com~~isdon. and 
the nbsequent clcetng of the ox>lginal N'ort}l..,South and l\tortheast-Soutllwes'h 
!he pxoete:rentW ttm.wq dive#ts a. ms.simum auuiber of ta.t~offs .ana::__ 
landings oveF liewa.rk l!ay and the Kearney Meadowst eliminates all take.;.offs 
and landings ·ove_, the center of Ellse.'beth and :reduce& to. a minimum landing 
ani take-offs ove~ the Weequa.h!c Park seot1on ot Newark and o-9-er Elitsabet}l.oo. 
port and. the ArtJlu:r KJ.ll-. (See aCCOtlllJat.Wins d.iapam~Appendix D, page 88) 
Other irttpo'l'ta.nt points o't the operating 'Procedures .laid. down when 
the Hew Yo!'k 'Port Authori t7 orier&d. cottrPlete reS'Wilption -of air serviees 
aJ'e as followst 
(l) liemcrval of all tra.iu1ns flights fl'Om Jewa.rk Airport exe.ept 
q;ualificaticn tli~ts wh!oh the.Oivt1 Ae:r~11aut:tcsAB.ministration regul&o.-
tions req~pe to 'be hl!14 the~e' { 2) m~iniu:~nstJet:l~tft!' not less than 1, 200 :: 
. ' 
f~et ot altitude for .as .long as -possible before actnal start of a landin&J 
(3) attainment of' 1,200 teet as sooa as possible after te.ke.offs before 
meld.n.g tvas t ( 4) the el !mi.nation o't engine "~upstt, except those 
. . . . . 
(.fS) instellatf.on of two-wq recording ettuJ:pment in the ll8Wark AiJ"!)o:rt 
Oontrol !ewe~, and (e) notifi4ation ·of all pilots using Wewark o£ the new 
!h$ llat1onal Ai;r ~sp<~rt Ooerd.ina.tinc Oommittee eitfphaeimei, 
h~eJ.t that there we,;li({' lia1-e to 'be 'some i;oau'ioations &f . tbe 't)Z"CTJOeed 
Sustem of J"UllWGY us'e Dde:t ·oerta!n wi~d OOJJ.titions. but. its experts 
esttma.t.ea that these would not cceu more thea 15~ ~t the time. ' 'since ' 
the :r&-t!fpeaing of ·the Al:rpart, pilo.is haVe· alwa.vs tH~en advised by the 
COntrOl towar·as to which ~W~ to use to minimise flight OTJerations over 
populated a~ea~. · 
Studies ·bY the "ordtnaid.ng ·oommi ttee of' the effects· at Idlewtld 
and La.G~cila att-Ports et ~rtmenting ~ having transvort t>lanes. hold a 
nlt.'tlimum ot 1,aoo· feet fJf SltUude when~i> possible tnd.teated that the 
l)reoedure GU'bsta.xttifilly reduCed coin-plaints a'G'Ilt lO'W-flzting• lJefO:t"El the 
Newark: cloeblg thei-e was nc) regulation to .PreTent iief,ax>ting aircl"af't ot 
allY• ma~Or C'JOinmereial S.i2'f1eld in the ottT f'rom fl.Vi!lg at low 5lt1tudes fGt' 
t'e1e.t1vel.y long distances after taking off, c>~ from esecutf.ng low...level 
tut"n:s toward. their fltght destination." 
The Port AtLthe:tUy• to :t-edue~;~ noise. conducted tests t'o deternt!fle 
tthteh ~a of Wewa.rk Aii"JlOfi w~ld. be 'best to d1Vel!'t 'engine ··~u~n 
n~teee awq fl'om the ears •t rGstdential commuil.ities~ . !he ra~.W:,s ~e 
ne~ess~ to insure 'high maintettance work standtUOdth Pos-t Authoti v 
e~neers' aeeured Ql>eas that inett.fed "'minimutll noise annoyance. u 
llotwtthetand.tng new sat~ds f.nstatled te eliminate llOtential 
tangere ~~ the epeRtton o¥ the lioa.rk A1~or'fl.. ~ome New Jersey ·~ps 
fi1ett· tnjuction'Qr~cee&ings age.inet the ~eunrption td f111.1 E~e:tvic$ at the 
Airport. Even before the Ail'l)oJHl was reo-oenea.. the ~~~ 1Gmmlttee1 
lne~ot*$-ted met in lnblabeth. en lfo"'teml,te!' t. ·1912~ fhe l~!ttee ~ 
c14ed that it would concentrate on gathering information ~ertaining to the 
noise mel!l&Qe. and hazard factors that they maintained would become -o:revalent 
- 41 .... 
once mere afte~ November 15th. reopening date of the Aitpo~t. Xt chose 
thi,e time to 'take this alternative ratherr> than q;o.eation the effeoti?eneee · 
/ . (2S) 
Gf ·the saf'e~d.s that the Pof't · .A\\~ox-1 '' wdl114. ~n.stal.l ~ · fhe COmmittee 
~. 
1Jook tb~ee ste-pe with l'6spm to the noise nuisaBCEU 
(1) tt attempted. to .seeu:tre iufol"matioa tm>ough the distribution 
. of ·10~000 ®orA qu.esttanna1J:~ei'J that were dist,.ilm.ted in the Ol.inton Rill 
and ls-on\ouni sections of Wewal'k, ana to the -people living in the 
mu.aicaipe.lities,. like Elletl\beth• wh• a~Pe membeJ.'s of the Mqor's Oomm1ttee, 
~n.Ooi'Poratea.. 'lo date, there bas bhft. no l)Ubllshed e.oknowledgntents of the 
,.esul ts of this B'IU'Vey. ,, 
Jli) It plated ·me®an1eal d.evi"s a~ vantage 'PO'ints. cievicee i~ 
·tended to ;mea:eV& the n.oi.ee "'"olwne 'bhat will b:e used to' Em:n'llc.rt ·the tn-
tomnation o'bta.inet: from the Cat*is ftceive4., ant· 
(8) It. aSked 1ihe News.t'k' He&lth De'f)at"tment te conduct a e,'tlfVey in 
the Weequ,ahie. Ol:tnton Bill and lt"on'boud sections of Newark and aB.Joiniag 
a»ea.s, to dete:rmine the effeet the a0:1ae has on -peo:ole Who are Victims -of 
the noise and who 11-ve ttl aforementloneO. s:eetione. 
A tuna of $25,000 was raised "·~esidente ot Newark, Eli~abeth, 
llUls!de, tlnton and tir.ulen with wbioh to start immediate legal proceedings 
in tbe event ot another crash within the cit1 limits. 
Certain segments ot residents 1n the v1e1j1t7 of the Airpon, it 
appea~s. are ettll resentful ove~ the continuation of onerations and have 
coattnued to Colll!)la:in e.\out no-'1 se nttisance. 1l'be)f'e are therefoJte, those 
segments, -perha'tls for -poU.tioal, eeonomie. o:t> e,ocial considerations., whieh 
have stu"bbornly . clung to their original s'tand to MV$ the rd.rport moved 
to another locats.on. It is evident thst a. gea.t deal had been done nrl~»l*'. 
to the ()'paning ot the Wewa:rk Ai:tport to tm~rove the O'Derating .oondt t1one. 
a keeping w!th the suggestions and reoomm-eruiatione of the v~arlotts tn .. 
V$stig~t1ng committees mentioned ab6ve. It a'O-pea.rs eou.ally evident to the 
'witep that those moat intimately oorieemed with the re.w-o~en1ng did. not 
bring ou'b tor '!'J11blio · eonslim'lltton all that the3' had done anli thei'"e'by did: 
not avail themselves of' the onnorturd.ty te improve the Airport's relations 
wlth the p:ab11e. 
Airpo!'ts are te~ esaen'Ual to the very existence of ou.!" nation." 
A community whieh e%pecte to kaE>T> u:p td.th the Y>rogress of manldnd must be 
se~ by an adequate airport to meet the oommuntty' e needs t~om this 
rapidly devel~ing modern means of t~eportation. »ut airnorte ~ot 
be mere contrivances left alone af'ter they al"e buU t for use or en,joyment 
by those ileedt.ng them.• ~heifl "Plana and po11eies; th•1r vtawe ana. !)rogr4ms. 
in taot. their whole e:ld.s'tenoe in the light of future a:na: "~,)resent day 
aotivittes ana d&velo'Pm&nt ahcttl4 be the 'pri.Jilaey eonoen of those ohaaged. 
wtth admtnlstertag themt 
It is ~untortune.te that the three crashes Whtoh oOC't11'red. ln the 
'heat't of' Eli#a'betihi l'ew :le,s#!fl!• have been 'blamed on \he N~ A1S*l'ort. 
cpecii'lealltt because of its -ol't)ximity ·to El i~abeth and adjacent oommmdtit ~· 
ell wt thin the gl ide..o.paths a.~a. of ai:rcratt. llo aviaenee wae brought 
' . 
during the lnvestigatton to su-pJ)c%Jt allegations thAt the rd'J"'ort was TJf)orl~ 
I 
designed and constructed. One -· 'Pause· tor a moment, therefore. to ask 
Wh~ther the ClOsing Of tha :td.rpori was jas'tified OX*' not'l Or Wt!iS its 
~lcsing neoess~ and erpedien'b at sUCh a time? Or c::)ul.d it be that its 
authottities realieed it was lligh time to euepe~d. opel"attons ·'beeause of the 
oemcttonal effects the crashes had had c:>n th$ publiOt who; at that time., 
~·tirml~ eonv!nced that the :Ai!'pc:rt was the cause·of these ai:f disaster~? 
Ott could i' aleG 'be that its authorities were 'becoming aware that certain· 
of the Newark Airpo:rt• s policies and programs were being :reflected in un• 
; ' . ' . ' ' 
., .. ' 
favorable ~ubli~ opintont 
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A. f!i!~l2J.mJit . 
hom a stud;r of the taots and figux-es brought out earlier ln th1ta 
paper., it becomes evidenf; that the re..apening of the Newal"k Airport was 
effected by' aets at omission er COWQieelon, direct ot- indirect, ln a. 
maaner suggestive of a lack of awareness of certain guideposts in publie 
relations.. Whe authorities conc:erned, in their desire to emphasize the 
role ot the A1r;port in the eeonomie set-up of the community, tailed to 
realize at the same time that the Airport-Community relationship is dual 
in nat~t tbat the Airpo~ is not the ~rinci~al 0but a participating unit 
which casts its shaclow on the wbGle "Pattern to the extent of its tmportaneE 
' (26) . 
and !nfl.uence~n 
When the Newark Air'pon was established in lgag. public considera-
tions ot its (tperatton 'began to grow ln size and ecu-pe.. tt meant that 1 t 
should sell itself to the publiC ever, single d~·not just oocasionall7• 
Xt meant a deeper need and awa!'eness to understand that the ehara.cter of 
the 'PU'bltc changes so Mpf.d.ly from dau to de;y.. It meant a eonglomeration 
~~ ~blems that demanded advance ~blio relations consideration in o.d., 
to W'&'V'~nt them trom developing into an emergency. 'l'h1a emergency had 
reared its ugly head.in the case of the Newark Ai~ort. replete with 
~roblems which needed solutions that were no longer ~f a preventive nature 
'but problems whiflh needed 'POSitive and ovative actions, 
Let us attempt to eval'I.Ulte and. analyae. from a -publi~ relations 
peint of vtew, the methods, pr~oedures. and teebn~s utili~ed !n the 
' . 
~ re-opening ot the Newark Airportt While oons1der1ng at the same time, 
(26) !lex F + Rarlow and Marovin M. Bla.alt, Practical ~biiadRelation!r 
.· (Harper & Bros ... , llew Yon, 194'f), p. 19?... . . 
certain f'ao11oi-s involotted since ita estla'blishment in 1929., 
Xn the htsto~ of the Wewa~ Airnort prlor to the three crashes~ 
there 'tfae no attem1')t ma.de by the authorities in charge to create a sound. 
ana. heal.tb3" relationship with its 1'\lblics •. Ah-lin& oompan1ee lndi'O'id:oallv 
try 'k promote their own intel'eets regaFdless ot whether or not it. affeote 
them as a whole.. They apet'a.te on the theory that thev ow no pa.rt1culs3J 
' ' 
allegiattee to their competitol's and. to the localities in which th-ey onera.t • 
fhey have. to a eonsidel"able d.eg.ree, ta.tled to 1.nter:r>ret themselvea and. th~ 
cause they rep:re~ent to the lY!l'bl:tc, 'by means of f'aote and figures. and 
thro~ the empl~,-ment of a.eeented tools to gain :public ~ort and co!tft ..... 
dsnce.. While it is obvious that their main inte1"est is to cater to 
ignored the tnte•ests of the residentiar,v and noa-passenge~ public. 
If the Chiet J"eswnsibt.lit? of an entity or organbation lR to 'be 
a goad cUt.men. its first task is to make a eatt'eful stucw of its ool!ll!1unity 
and ne!glibors. '!o date, the lJewark Ailr!!H>rt t through ! ts croerators, h.A.e no 
oonducted su.eh a stu.~ and. because of this. it ha.s no ~ of aacertatnbg 
the ~lationship. it aetuallV bears to the cities of Newark, Eliuabeth, and 
adJoining areas.. It fa.iled, in the words of Harlow and l)laek, 8 to put 
eaeh eamrnu.nit,- under a magnifying glass.. i'he stt•ong peltson.alities within 
1 t, the eresg.,.ouren'bs ttt 'P!'e'lratl ing public o-p!ntov.. the major trends re-
'P!'esenting its inte:tests and g&als, its ~ortant institutions both publS." 
and -private.-.e·vel/'1th1ng having a signif'ioant bearing ut~on 1:ba U.:f'e and 
( 2'1) 
growth ... • 1:1) would seem apt \o s'ate that these autho:rities were 
le.bo~ing under the impression that thaee al'&a.s have to gr.ow with the 
Newark: Airport a1 though it is obvious that ·the partnership is irre-vocable. 
!be same policy is equally true ln the case of the- -various airlines 
ut111aing the Wewa~k Aitnort and 1t~tfaeilities. Wh~ Port authorities ' 
and. thfll Airlines key men we:re deeply aw~e of the economic aet)ects of the 
communities, but they seem to have forgotten the soololog1ca1 ana 
pqchologieal tlllPact that $1.zt t11EUUJ'P01"tat1on has had 'OJ)&n the cemmonity 
·as welli!l 
After the tirst crash. no· c6nstruct1\fe action wae taken tow~rds 
a]:Jl)eastng the community. '»here was no attem~t; \made to a.eq_uatnt the !lllblic 
ot th& true facts. !he New 'fe:rk .Port Authorities meMly sa:\ baok and 
waited tor the Civil Aeronautics Administration t~ take aeti~np No 
attitude sarver was ~dertaken to measu7e the pnlse ot ~ublic o~inion. 
And neither were attempts made to educate and inform the pablie th~t all 
m.oaes t!1t .tr&ns'Porte.tion have their p:ro'blem~, parti.eula.rly aoeidents which 
. are the realdi). of human lindta.ttons. psyeht_\logieally and tJl\:vetologice.ll:ft 
that reseuoh -eonolus1~e1r -poittts out tha.t, ai? tra:vel is the safest. 
Likewise, a:tte:t" the seeond crash, nGthin~ was done t() ass,tage the 
sentiment of an outraged t;Sithenry: neither was an e.ttel'!I'Pt IM;lde to regain 
the conftden.oe, there was ~'O'er any at Eillt of the 'PUblics invol-voed. · All 
the Po~t Authc•U~ies .did was 'o sUck to- the usual Tl~aotice. of si t-an&.wai 1 ~ 
! . 
and then rel7 ~n the findings of the Givil Aeronautics Admln!st~atien ~im~ 
Tla'fW' often.. attrilm:te ~auees af. accidents to pilot error. p~or judgment. 
aaa faulty landing or tak~of'f teohni(lue. 
After the third air crash. tlhe Port Au:bhori.ties. ln what a-p~e~e¢ 
to 'be a battle of nerv'$s,.. and i7:1 total de-spera.tiGJh oou1d no~longer bold 
"n to its fa.vol'i te technique and had. te secede to ilhe ext sting demands o' 
- 4? •. 
the '0\tbU.c to haVe the Airport clceea.. It is Nmaltka'ble to no,e, at this 
3unoture, that the· cloeve vas an f.U.StiGn which the pu'bl1c cottld not bring 
about in Sf days.. What an undenia.blv expensive rasul t. requiring for its 
completion a toll of S7 lives! 
The National Air !ransport Coordinating Committee, though composed 
ot leading atlines representatives throughout the countF,V. did not striotl 
r~:resent the interests of lnd.itiridusl airlines, ignoring as 1t did• the 
common goal of the aviation industry ..f6r t.fl)ieh it was esta'bl hhed., 
!he "partioipa.tion' of all airlines w~s brought .. a'bout onl7 after 
the tlU'ee trashes and only beea:t~se the immediate closure of the Ai!"Port 
vlvldly- brtught to their attention the need for COG'Peration among them-
selves. !hey were'beeom!ng affected ~1 the Airport's closure. tt wns the 
Doolittle Commission •hieh ga~ them the impetus to align themselves 
~gather as a group wllling to seek their own betterment at the saMe time 
recognizing their responsibtlities to the affected communities~ 
!he annual re'Do:rte l"egularl:J' issued by the orterat.ing air-1 ines at 
the Newa~ Ai~Grt were surely e1o~uent testimonies that nothing was wrong 
so tar as financial equiU.bl'!um 1t1as ooll.GE!l'net.. 'hase reports. however. 
strictly adher~ to the tradition tha' the beet ttnaneia.l reoort was one 
that sald. the least.,. Wheae 1'.et>Ori.s contain a miatmum of taeilual info%'ma ... 
tion an the loeal. leYel ~ EaQh :Partioi:pating airline did not take eogniaan e 
ot the f'aet that the loeal. CCl1'117l'llni v plays an inmot>ts.nt role in their owe 
(~S) 
all epelfations.. Many membel,ls f!f the otmmmd.ty of Newark and environs 
e. who were inte!'es~ed in the aeti'91t1es of the Airport. -na.rticulal'iy as it 
(a&) tttnte!'l)rettng lusinesa and the OomoaJJ.Y ta 'Netghbo:rs and. ibnployees.• 
laduf,t,t:tt\al l•ifmk9tint:• D:eeem'bert 1948, lh m. 
affects their areas. were alwnys taee~ wtth the task of aacerta1~ing the 
o:r-edt ta'b11.1 ty of iflto!'mat 1on and source .. 
Arttr J"G'pU,ta.'ble organ:batt~n recognizes that go.o4 comnn,mity relation 
(aD) 
can break down in the fatte of :'bai -publ!Git)r. tt seams, however, th.:"l.t the 
Newark authorities have not 4~elo~ed and maintained sound and heelt~ 
; 
relationships with the ~ress as is evidenced by a series of editorials 
(SO) 
and news releases pointing to the Air-port as a .6 comrnuni ty' mqa,ceu. A 
New York newspaperman who was assigned to cover the airport oaaua117 re. 
ma,..ked: ffTh.ey were pet-feotl;r willing to give us newspe:,e!:'men. full facts 
about their safety records illttt when an e.oeident ocounea.. · theJ' · refuse<r,ta 
answer ctuest~ons o:r give out facts. saytng 'that only after the CiVil 
Aeronautic$ Admirlistzoatton had disclosed. its findings could tll.ey funish 
us what we wantad~u · When the s·aeonli erash eecurr-ed,. no assistance was 
given to re'PQttters and photogra:phere e.seigned to cover the accident. Whea 
the thi:rd crash ooOUZ'Hd. howavert this attitude of those eharged with the 
operation of the,ai~ort had c~sia&rald~ change! to~ the better. 
:Be~ause unfavo~a'ble ~inion a'bou1} au orga.nb:ation or- entit;v Gtten 
~ -, 
stems from lack of lafo~mationt mi~lnfofmatton, or mtsoonoa~tions o~ the 
~aets. there is great need .for a frank and tactual .elationahi~ with the 
p#ess, the radio. and other oommunteations media. tt the Wewark Airnort 
authorities bad onl.7 shown in,et'est tn -,eriodic "'l'ess oo:nfet'ences, fo1' 
exam~le, during which certain problems confronting the Ai~ort eou~4 have 
have been as vehement. 
( a9) Veme ·lhu.tnett .. npz.eas Be lations" You and Tout' Publ io(Wew York t Harper 
& !rGthe1"s, 1943)1 'Plh 13Q.;.l3th 
(SO) 'l!x.'fer}S '~!111e~, lleeenibe:r 17, 1951~ lh 1. 
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It is true that each 1adivtdua.1 airline o-perating at the Airpert 
makes us& of tthe: radio at~- a medium tor reaching the public. 'l'he airlines 
have utilized this med.iwn to the fullest eJttent by sponsoring newsr,knd 
entertainment programs. But ln a great maJo~ity of cases, 'he pas~ing 
commertt.'als have me1"ely stl"essed: s-pe~d and economy 'bli'. air travel~ . Let u.s 
consider a full~page advertisement ot the,Alnerican Airlines. Ine •• one 
qommon to all airlines• eeJ.U.ng.a-ppS"oaoh which s1'J)eared in the P~UI 
~cgra. July a. 1953~ 
lew Ameriean brings Boston the finest lo~eost air-
travel to Lo~ An~eles via. ~6 air to~lst service 
effective luly 1 isfh 'lhe cost is $106 "Plus taxt 
300 mile..-1'e...,.h(l:ttl" .'Presetll"ieed DQ...St~.n. regalarly 
eohed:aled daily servtee~ o'lt'er as years .exp-enoe 
in eell'ast-to-coa.st o'Derat1 onJ ngulmr AnH~rtcaa air• 
lines fllgnt crews and maintenance. For ~erBflation 
l.)hone Liberty 2-o-6700 or 101i!" tra"'fE!l .agen\. · . 
~his ~e of ed.vertisem.ent tyr,ioal of' all &il"linee is also 'broad.... 
.cast in J"A.tilio and televi.eicn. tt seems to "r~rovide answers to ed:o.CJational 
and info:rmRtive broadcasts tor the ail'lines .. 
When the Jewnrk Air~ort was rec~ened for fUll o~erations in 
:November 15. l95a, no attempt; was made 'by ·the .Airlines and. the Port 
autho.rities to inform the· 'P'!lblto, through the radio and television that 
changes and rno~ficattona to suit tbe demMde ot the 'J)ttblic for a saf'el" 
ah.•port had been. met.. ':he news of the -re .... Gpening 11011, d. not. have been 
known if the neW9'J'al)ers in .Nav Yol"k and iu. !lew Jersey had nGt earried 1 t 
and radio news commentators bai not mentioned it .i~ t.he!r. regular broa~ 
Wodq the ~adlo ranks with the ness as an important source. of 
. {32) 
news. entertainment, and iafomation for millions ot -people. !brough 
(31) »ost;on D~UJ ReeGrd. (Jaostont Mass.:). Vol., SSl•llumber 8,11. 9~ 
3~ Ce.ntr11 and All'Dort J?s c o1o · . of Ra.dt .• (New Torkt Ra:1'1,ers,~l935)t 
a uiso u.se ot them, the Newark Airport eoUld have informed. th\il pu'blia 
that it is carryi.!lg out to the letter the many safeguards ~et up 'b:r the 
Civil Aercnautics Administration and other government agencies for the 
~rotection and welfare ot a11 ooncern$d. mhe,v have failed to aoquaint 
the nu:~lic of the st:r:tot regulations laid down bf the go"Vel"ll.'nent tor the 
pilot, o'Oera.tor, designer and manufacturer, and control sg~cies: . that 
htgh standards of phys1cel fitneGs and mental ~ertness are prerequisites 
for the modern Job of fly1.ng the :pX>esent a.ircX>mi't; that the geogra'()hie$1 
location of the airport had no b~ing on the erashes; that 'the causes 
of the accidents were -purel)" \ecbnioal in nature; that the -problem of 
nuisance 1s being. atteD.ded to. and the.~ ea:oa and co~ern ""·research 
and studies are now being undertaken at the instance of the airlines and 
ha0 'been -plao.ei U1;)0n pa~u:umger (JOmf'ori and conveniea('e and not enough 
c.m eons1d&!'ation of the non..-tlyif!g l)Ubl ics who l'ive olose to the At:rporih 
' 
; 
ment ageneies and the operattug :airlines. Xn many instance$, investiga-
tions of era.shes by goTe:rnment agene!tes ha.\te become routimry f.n nature .. 
Some of these agencies. while Charged with the ts~k of digging deep into 
the causes of aooident1-h have acted 1:lke d.oetot.'s treating symptons rather 
than diseases. And m~ of their reports and ~eoomrnendations deal in 
generalities.. Where is too l1lUOh stgnific~oe l)laced. \'J."Pon ')',)eri'ormance 
pertinent 1)1lbl1os., partietdaPly en safety. 
As has been mentioned ~lier in thh cha:pte~. a11 Of'gafti~ation 
•r institution desiring to fit itself permanently to the community, must 
to its env1ronmen~ by seeing changes from afar and make neeessary pre. 
pa.rattons to cope wtth these changes •. whetheJO gradual or sudden • .APT,larent y 
the Newark Airport author1t1ee were ~e that certain segments ot ~e 
aAJoining OofiUntdtities wex-e not wUU.ng "Ptartie.s to the aoeepte.nee o,. these 
changes. even befoJ>e the craShes oecttr3!"ed~ Yet they waited fetr the hour 
when th:ts small group, constttating 4 pel" oent o£ the commUDity. began to 
e.dltt a great 1nf'luence into the thinldng and attitude of the majority. 
Again• sinGe its start of operations in 19~, the Bewar!~ .Air'Pcrt 
and lts of'ticiale have' failed to utilize a public relations technique 
1n creating and mainttng a favorable publio attitude toward it. Many 
residents living b. the l)lto:dmity o£ the Airport. when asked what they 
know about the Airport. its plans* -polio'lee, an4 programEh earoastlaally 
answet- tn the following veint nz know the Bewa!'k Airport is a gxoea.t Pl"O• 
Jeetured that manv a resident of these areas adjacent to the airpol't has 
knowledge of the 1ntr1caciee ati11£e4. tn· the c-oeJ.tation and. maintenance 
of e.i:ro:ratt, . and the -problems confronting the Ail"'crt t teelt. 
Had the Ai:rn.'JOri authorities otJened hou.~e regular!,-. -perha.ns on 
a yearly basis as is usually oondueted 'by renuta.ble and well-meaning 
bu.slnees and ln.du.etrlal J.~\1\'a.tions thS"ott@hcut the countl?, fa'forable 
~eesions among tts vtattora would have brought about a series of 
$ain-reactions among va.J-loue publics, resulting in rm.blio acceptance 
and recognition of the fact that tor •ver,v aeeomplishment involved the~e 
are aecompaqtng rit~Jkst that oha.ngee 'bt-ougbt abcut 'bj" modern living are 
wrought with ha~ards and d1tf1cultieet that 'O:rospeotive rewards .ident1fiet1 
with the Airport outweigh estimated dangers. 
~ts open houes a~~voaeh is a sound ~ of providing citizens 
la those ueas faetual i!1fcrma\ion about the Alt"llOtft, its opel'ations and 
' {33) 
maiutenance, its human "lations progl"'am* and its place in the ccnmnud.ty. 
It is true tiha~ •!~line operators have been providing the121' st~­
held.~»s With fina.ntU.a.l J:>ep:o~ts. .But these l"$'POI'ts, in sen&l"a.l::t. eonilain 
mel"ely a S\J.lmna.tt.cn ot Pl'Ofit and less •. without deattng in more 4ete.i.l 
puticmlarly in the oomp7!ehae1on of time~, effort,, and sta.diea in air• 
. 
craft maint.~auee e.nA c!lpsratiaa. , 
file Doolittle Ct\mmiseion. lle<aognimed that the lfewe.rk A17POJ>t .• 
while su.'h~tantie.ll1 Sate. was a laee.l pi.to'blem, particularly bom the 
:point et viett'd ·noise au1$a.Uo• and l'iek analy-sis. It reoommended that 
ope~·Ung :p:roeed:ol•·es be followecl "07 beth a.i:ro-ratt and airport in the 
matte!'. ot landings and teke.otfts; p)N)V14e4 fo'l" mainte~ of not lee'S' --:_ 
than 1,200 fe~t o~ a1titu~ tar a~ long as poss1ble betore actual start 
.;' 
eft lani!tng ani .-tta.inment of the same 41. ti-t'Wle as soon as poeslble att• 
ta.k~otfe M4 be.to:te making turns~ Whie altit.-e was found to m1n1m1me 
the effect of noise ge:n.e:ratel \y the eqif.le il'l flig)1t~ (For complete 
eval:a.atf.on of Report, See A'p-pel'lcllx A); 
· 'Phe Oomm1ss1on was f¥"an\t eaough to admit that absolute sa.:tety for 
the i~uUvidttal is an id.ealt one which ts ever sought 'but never attained. 
At the same time; 1 t unde,:~$O.OX'ecl .. the American ooneep,. of and ao.oeptance 
of caltmlated. r-isk,. viewing ii; a.s au inesoapavle condition to the en-
Joyment of life in a mraoh.anioal age such as we now live in .. 
(38) ~ F,. Barlow, PultJ:io h1t\iOJ1.§ ip._War yd P$}A9i·{Nw York:t Karpel" 
& Brothers. lt-42) i pp.. lO&llS"' · · 
:But while the Doolittle »eport was as a whole an ideal. eolut1on 
to the P"blem of safety ln commat"cial a.via.Uon, :1\ did not go a.aat> 
. eno~ into the aver~all safety p~ogztam inhe,.-ent h aviation ot this kf.ncl .. 
fhe resulta ot its findings on all the th~ee crashee iid not disclose 
~ d.i;-ect fault or B.is~epaftW with .the. airpori itself', nor did it re. 
' 
veal causes dUect]J' attributable to the l'llots .. 
tt is o•ly lesical to asmtmet thel!'efore. tlt.s.t U' the:ve had been 
ne malfunctioning cf the ttwee ai:rCll'e.ftv ·there would have been no crashes 
d the consequent loss ot 1 ives; · llad the cmsltes oeeurecl man.v mile a. 
_,. aWq t"m the·~~irt)on, the ail'!Jol"t wOUld not have been cOlosed,. {Buftalt'h 
ftctoheste:r anct S~e.ouse Md net eensue· not' 1Jtt1eetigate theb ait'po:rta 
alth~h the Ame~ican At~linee lenvat~ ~id take eft ~m them res'Pectively 
'PflOI' to its 02/'a.sh in illlaa'be\h enXJotite to !1~ A$.l'f)02l't.~) 
lt appet.U?a that the element Gf' time had wor.ked against various 
interests that deef.l"ed the A!rpol't ;re ... opene~ kt it ls e'lten more proper 
to say that these interests were behind the times. Fot> esample, th& 
Newark Oh.arnber ef t:QmmeMe only t"ee.lized the importance of a SUl"Vey" of 
the eommtmttles affected 'by the Aix-port•s closure when it a'J)l)eared that 
the 41osue was working aga.lnsil i:ts e'bjeeti'f'e and also against the 
membe~e• interests. 
One thing can be said fer the Newark Olmmbett of Commerce. hoWS"Ver .. 
It seemei te have been p'tded. by eor:veot public :relations when it did. not 
reso~t to lobby'· ng tactics to have th$ Aif'PCrt to~epened. · lt did not 
Tiew this mu.ch ... talkea.,.,.of' 'Pl'OCe.d.ure commonly used by, powe)' blocs as an 
et~~ct1ve tnstrument·to 1ite~lly io~oe.the government and its agencies 
to have the Airport resume full operations. It considered the community 
as the final arbiter~ J,v a sincere p~esentatton at the fact that 
lmsinesa and 1ndustr,v in New lersey aJte tnt;erweven into the fabric of the 
OtD.JDI!'nlnity and that the same all'~ rlepenlent '!1'POl1 the 41rpo~t for their 
existence. the Chamber received overwhelmingly ta•o~able replies to have 
the Af.2'J)ort !'e.-opened. 
:a. §!!OO~ST!Oli$,t 
9!h~ ll'ewarlt Ait!port 1e a commereial asset, .Partioula~"ly to ei ties and 
towe umuul it. It benefits these al1eas directly as a.n employer ot local 
label".. It 1s a trade resource to the me.ilyi 1ndu.str1es in the ?ictlnity. tt 
has not only plf.W'ed e.n important role in the development and progress of 
the couummitiea in close l)ro:dmity to ~t but has also been a m'Oat notabl:e 
:Pal"t.tc:lpant in the master plan ot aviation expansion to meet the :requi~e. 
menta Qt ~n induetria.l era., 
tn the l'~~ening of the Wewark Airport, however, certain important 
co.nsid.ehtion, were :not taken into account or possibly lost sight o'fr from 
a public :relations point ot view. 'here is no dou.'bih howevat-. that the 
uthorities in charge of the re.opening had acne theil'" best under the 
GUteumstaac~s to~ the greatest good of the p'tlbU.e~ 
Following are the considerations which might have efteetively 
ae1*1te4 as guideposts in the re;.openlng of' the Ai.-port, an4 whloh, notw1t}l.o. 
etandbg the lat>se of a number of montbs of its renewed O'f)ere.tione, mQJ" 
still well be utiliaei; 
1 .. Formulation and. implementation of a well ... defined ana integrated 
policy which mat be- fof the g"atest good of the greatest nuni'ber,. ~is 
poll~ mast be etrletly adhered t& unde;t a. long-zoa11ge planning point of 
view ~~ the Ml"Pc1't. 
2, A penet7atbg and analytical stud¥ ot the eommui ties s'I.U"i"oudtng 
residents• atti.tud~. the complexity ot relationships between and among 
various g~e as for example, wealt~ sections, the slums, mtno~i~ 
settlements, 3!'aQial grou:ps. etc.,. Different oommwd.Mes within the areas 
'atteeted must ·also 'be stu.d1ed._ 
Likewise, the m!l.jo!" t:t"ends repl'esenting goals and interests. the 
cross-c\Jl'lrents of :Preva.Uing public opinion, the strong personalities 
within each, asd ev:e17thing whieh ~as a st.gnlticant;'bea.rlng 'tl1'JOn the 1 if'e 
and growth of the Airport must be takes into aocollllt. 
3.. An exbausti~e. and ec1ent1fle stud;v of the A\rport itself, the 
position f.t ocC\l'pies, the service l.t performs, and eve"'3'thing which 
oha.racterimes its role ln the collllll1Uliti~s must be undertaken as soon as 
possible. 
4" A program of action aimed at wtnnins back the sup-port and 
eonftdence of the 'PQblles iavolvetl,~itnist 'he curted o11t.. ~his p!"agram 
should be based on an attitude survey to "e oond.ueted ·b)" an independent (M) . . . 
eurv~ orgent~atton. Whe tools ot publio ~elationsf ~Etbt~arl~ ~ublielt~ 
i~stltutlonalaadverttsing, printed materials. employee activities. stoc~ 
holder reports, publ1cattone, and ~ther media must be egploited for fUll 
use and benefit. 
59 'the National National Ail"' !r.ansport Coordinating Committee 
should 'ake a tnol'e aat1ve t~art ead put increased eff'ol't into its llUblic 
relatione functions• tt shou.ldssee to tt that f.ndivi.dual. and group 
interests of the. airlines !t r(Wps-esents ue equitably represented. 
6, The mere fact that practically all of the employees of the 
Airport had sid.~d with the Port Authorities in the matter of the r~openine 
of the A11"})ort is not a necease.ey indication that'labor and employee re-
lations an on a high le'9'el.. A clea.n ... cntt. definite, comprehensive and 
( 34) Harlo\ot, op. cit., ,p. 108-115. 
understood labor ~oll~ muet ~e develoned ani made to wo~k effeotive1~.(35} 
?.... ltelatlon$ with the 13ress should. be strengthened,.. 
Sl • Arrangements sho'\ll.d be made to include ·tor member-ship In the 
Rational Air 'l're.nsport tleo:rdtnating Oemmittee non-schedUled airlines 
utilising the J'ewal"k A1l'po7tt as well se ether leading a!J"po'f!'ts. · There 
sh.Guld be a twe-.wq CO!tllitW'l!oatlon between non-scheduled airlines o:oerators 
and the eched\lled airlines OJ)ettato~s. !hia>ie a step towards minimizing 
the influence or power Of preesU.l'Ef gl'OU'f)t;h. 
9. A safety program should 'be launched among the airlines u'bilidng 
the lew~k Airport. ~artleularlv tn the matter of malntenanee and onerat1onl 
'Phere should be lese· effort to cut cost ot maintenance on paper for 
greater pro:f'tte. with the res'Ol111ng r:lee in insurance coste due··;to accidents 
10.• 'l'hel!e !!h.,:,_ a 111> " 'better laie~n 'bet""'l!ll Bad amor~g the 1.>11'blio • ·1 
l 
the airlines, ·government agencies, ana the maintenance ~ewse I 
(36) I 
11. The Newark AiFDo:rt should "'ber·ot>en fGr guided t.ours · to the 'Oublllt• .I 
. - j 
with aceeat en visual d!spley ot ~peratlonal procedures ·bt the use of 
films and pilot talks.· !nte:negatton ,.. the. public during the tours should 
beeenaovaged. , · · · , · · · · · · · l 
12~ !'he .Coi!UnuniM.es and vu.ioua pu'blics coneemed should be kepfl 
. . . (~) 
well intormei of changes t>r modifications in plans and o-oeratt.ons before 
lhese are to take effect. 
. I 
· ' · 13. !'here· should be no atteJDl')t · whatsi!lever to crea.teHm ai~f'\tJf mysteJ"Y 
about erashes; it is the unknown whiOh makes people panteley'P...and tearful. 
I 
!nth ~• aoeuracv shoUld be the gaidt:ng eonstae,-ations tn all !'SJlOI'1Ua of 
tnveettgatlons f?f ••oidEJnts. 
(SS)l~lt;t Yode.-~ ~rsonne1 Mana&!!ement and Ind.u~trial P.el~.tto~a,(!iew YorkJ 
Me-fra.w..Bill :Book Compa!J7~ 1944). p-o. 390...401. . .. 
f3$) Philip Lesly, ~'l,lblie :Rolati.OfiS ~fflld'book,(Prentice...Ball,New York,l950)t w.t54-1i 
;_, 'l''t..,,!!Jl ,i .~/!!!;>j_/!!t'l 
··~· 
ADDl'riOWAL OONSl:DERATlONS 
An? of th& mttdh pub11Q1~sd orashe$ identified with Wew~k Airoort 
eou'!d.,.all ha'Ve b&t;m ~oided by the a'P")lieat1on of· good maintenance method$ 
and adhe)itenee . to proper o~cwat1on techniques b7 the airline companies 
·1tr0'01?et.. Solentifte ilrprovements 4tlt materials anti technology have: taken 
the luu:$ll't1S ou.t ot air t:ranspo:rtatlo~. But new scientific improvements 
e.nd new tone$l'ts llnlst 'be taken advantage of before air tra11sportation can 
tully ttea11ae its potential goal.; Whe alh:raf't ope,-atore and government 
ageneies t!W'Gl 'ited snu.et ohange theil" att! tud$'SJ they mast -pereei1tre that 
theiindtt.stJ'? is ln a stage ot rt:Yp!ci gftwtb., !he$' Jnusl. therefore,. be 
Jog is etUl the nemesis of the aViation ind.uetl"B'• Fog., the reeul t 
of conditions of nature, however. ts not the greatest hazard that en-
velops the industey- at '!>resent,. !he Mental 4onfueion, the lack of 
p&!'8eptlon of the ne$ds and goals that shl'ouds the aviation prognun is 
the fog that elO\'IAs tbe issue~ ~:ls fog roefewed to ts that whiCh covers 
the entire !adustl-1 f'rom the dre1ving board to the manufacturer to u1 t1mate 
ope~ation.,. Manmade, i 'b hinders the rapid d.evelo'f)ment of air transl)orte,... 
. tlon f'ae111t!es. 
'Phe tn"'flX ot the J)rGblem of e.ir safety 1 tea 1n the area of the 
mainten~ce and operation of equipment and fae111ttee pertinent to al~­
tPansportatton... 'lhe maJor trouble ef air travel otJera.tors has been the 
fact that they have always tl'Gated SFttll'tome., not diseases. InV'E!stigattone 
only tempot'&rilJ' cGneot the s'! \\lations·; they ne"9'el" effect pe~ent cures 
.. 57 .. 
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~t>.e -present -poU.ey t;f inveettgatit"ne b~ themselves will bring no 
~anacea, for onlu s.rmptoms, not eauoes, are being con~idered. The es. 
isting ~stem runs tn vioiou~ circles. really a mu~ ~rotective 
aaeoc1e.tion corporati~rh It ie evident that the air nub11e, -pedestrian 
and resident, ie entitled to some "1'0teet1on for the millions 'being ~ent 
annually of t~~ers' f\mda. 
New legislation is urgently needed to correct the nresent methods. 
Gongress should immediate!, create an independent air satet,y board, a 
seuera.te ail" commission divorced entirely from control 0f the now govern~ 
1ng agencies" A ~ommisu!on courpo.sed. of menibera who are not allied to any - ·. 
l)Ol it, cal hieraroey oro combine. whose -primary fvncU"n will 'be JOe-witing 
a new code of sate~ foP the d-esign, maintenance and c.merati('n of id.r-
eraft and si~ort alike~ A uode that wi11.1nsure ~rotect1nn to air 
tailored to meet the needs of the ~resent and the tutnre trend of aviation; ~- . . 
not an alteration or modit1caUon of the '!'):resent rn.les and regulations. 
~e iSPStem now tn use wa.s witten for planes travellini!-at l~~h .. 
'Poda1', that is landing S!)eed. · 'fqj'ing to regulate the modern air carrier 
with a speed of 300 mph,· 5 miles a minute and up to the ~eed ot sound~ 
by these obsolete rules is fantasUe. 
There are th.ree major aspects of this failure of the air carrier: 
1. The dedgn of' 'both airport and. aircraft has not ke"Pt 
1)ace with the industJi1• 
2. The maintenance and c!rperA.tion of ait>cr1:1ft has not ke:ot a-
breast of the technological advances made by eoienae. 
3. The oodes of saf'e1J1, i.e., methods and pvocu~durea, utilized 
by the controlling agencies are outmoded. and have outgrown 
• 
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their usetnlness. 
Air design needs new ooncepte evolving around an a~dit1onal factor-
the element o~ time-not miles per hour but feet ~er second. The,y Should 
'\ 
use pqchologioal research for the answers to todey's aviation 'Problems. 
An airplane pilot at the controls oru1e1.ng along a~·aoo mph, 5 m!lea 
a minute, 440 feet a second has to act with swift mental reflexes. in-
stattaneous a~raisals of situati~ne, split second timing. (For the un-
initiated, the words "one thousand and oDe" measure e~aotly one eeoond 
or the time to travel 440 feet.) Take tor example the failure of the 
DC-6 aircraft which figured in the th:bd Cl'ash. 
'fith the least pause, doubt, or hesita.ney on the ~not's -part. there 
are catastophio results, No second t~~als are possible after these 
m$mentary failures. That DC-6 takeoff grossed 83 thousand pounds, e~ 
eeed.t.ng the maximum permiesable load for landing by 6,800 pounds., Oon ... 
eequently, :prior to landing the equi:valant or 1, 333 gallons of gasoline . 
... 
had to 'be jetUssoneci. One miata..lte-turning the wrong valve, -pushing .the 
wrong lever. could mean lossoof fuel ~ressure •. An air loak in the tuel 
~stem either results in !natant fai\ure of all motors or inadvertentl7 
l'EWersing prepellor blades with consequ$nt lose o~ power" tn any event, 
' 
with the death of' the pilo1St the true cause ot the crasb may never be 
known. 
Tne airline pilot is leaded down with ~gnlat1on upo~ regulation, 
formulas $nd p~ooedurea from the manufacturer to the operator to the 
eont!"()lling e,genoies w1tb the w}W. when. where and how to "'erf'orm under 
all oontingenaies, "Dlus the oare of T>as~enf!ers. CRrgo. and mail.. The 
above is bu'b a brief outline of' the du\i.es and res-oonsillilities of the 
pil!lt in any etr~ergeney. lfbue the nJajO!" need of the designer is to enable 
... GO-· 
the -pilot to accomplbh hi!:': tns'~ tdth ex-pediency~ S~liciey ot design 
withm.t'· COI'll!>le%1ty is ot !'P.ramonnt iflll10rtanee if'"the -pUot :1s e!'tpected to 
c~e with emergenoi~e. 
fhe pemecy needed is a ~ontinuous educatlontll ·'J')rogram. both for 
meohan:to and -planE~~ o:pe!'ator.. fhe practice of pUote flying low in 
marginal wes.ther clo~e to the gt'O\Uld OJ'> in "'!'OXimity to the airnort shoultl 
be discontinued at once. Once the ~lane changes its altitude from the 
l~el, an in turing of sudden loss of potfer, the dange!' of quick stalls 
and out of control oh~acte~i~ties increase, e~ecia.lly ~t low and critica 
sreed. 
A oarefUl·examtnation of the most recent nata on aviation develo~ 
ments d.iseloses the faot that attention and efforts have been direeted 
mainly to the e?olvement of the methods which in~eaae re1iab111t7 and 
eff'icieney of a ~lrme. but one ma¥, with aa:fety, sa,"(' ~h~t "'ra.otica.ll~ nO 
effort h~a 'been m:l~.e towards d.ecrealdng, if' not co'mp1etel.v nulH.fy'ing, 
the element nf' human enor i.n aircraft aeetd.ents. W!'lat could be the reason 
'bel,ind thisf 
The general tendenc.y h~s been to !~rove t~e ~OWP~e o£ the human 
being-..i.e., by centering the el!Tpha<sis on hie ,t'ltential.i ties foP ekill, 
cfudgment. memory and other -p}Vatoal end psycholog-ical attributes.. A 
'broader consid.erati~n of tlte subject will yield the fact tha~'-huma.n error 
in aircraft o~erati~n 1s le~s ~ossible of reduction through such stress 
on the im~rovement of the human being since these attributes, unlike the 
technical factors which can very well be 1'lredicteoYwith aeeurA.ey end 
Qan be handled s.cqordin~ to man~ wishes, do not rema:tn constant from da:T 
to daft and conse~uently do not a~mit ot ~ertection. And where certain 
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irn,o~eible of ~reventlon~ 
fhis being so. how, then mq one r.eduee or minimi~e the danger of 
aircraft a.oeidents, hSJmenings which have brought tragedy to countless 
people in recent months and years? At this ~oint, it wo~d seem worth• 
while to recall a.m-irud:~1e of human life, and this ist Errors:t are 
relatively rare when the task to be performed is eas,v, as a corollary 
~ which we have the tolltlV ing 2 As the task b.oreases in difftcul ty 
the ~ossibiltt,y of the occurrence of errors oorresoondingly increases. 
Thus, it would seem logical to conclude that ~ reducing the diffieult,v 
or difficulties encountered by humans in the ~erformance of any task, 
the n,llTlber of errors would be reduced~ 
Lately, too high- a degree of denendenee has been ~laced unon the 
l)owers of the indi'ridua'l. and',bis infallibility with regard to asnecte 
ot aerial Ol)eration. A more sensible view would! 'be, to look unon ... ~~tain 
other objective factors not only in nature but also in the operating 
eonditions, among which mq 'be mentioned: better fiying cend1ticms" 
more reliable motors, more accurate weather :f'oreci!Uttlng. inmroved. 
lighted runways, and other simil~r factors which would make the ta~k 
of the ~ilot easier. 
If the aircraft designer !n hie manta for -performance vould eon• 
eider the pilot'snphysical limitations and so design the aircraft with 
a simplified control panel. the governing agen~ with stm~lified 
regulations, and the company give treqnent refresher familiarization 
courses in safe flying, illien and Gnly then can the pilot 'be qual if1ed 
to make the split-second decision which comes to all ~ilots at one time 
orr another. 
The instrwnent ,ane1 must be simplified.. fhese instruments are de ... 
9igne4 to ~how~ change from no!"l!lal onerat1on., As long a~ the instru-
ments remain within safe operational limits. there is no need for the 
., nilot to constantly check snd recheck. ll'hus. tt an electrical fle.'P' wh1eh 
would unmask the 1nst%'Ulllent the instant it shows M7 Vaf'iati('lrs from the 
nor.mal. were ueedt it w~uld relieve the alreaqu overburdened nilot. (For 
example. obseJ:ve e.ny- modern telephone sw!; tohboard tn oneratiGth) 
Let us :now look at the ~11ot when an emergen~ looms. 'ravelling 
at 440 feet -per second, a deoid.on hgn been made which mel'lD.s life or death 
to many. lt is suggested that research be conducted &s to whether the 
-oilot should have more mental tre~dom of e.ctton fo!' inLtnedie.te decision 
baaed on his apryraisal of the situation or wait an enswer from· the ground 
control miles awq with no knowledge ot the situation on hand. 
Another facto~ concerned with air crashes survival is thAt the d~ 
signer must take cognhance of hitherto neglected built .... in ~assenger 
saf,ety on th~ air tranS"Port oer'1"ier, with better entra11oes, and adequate 
e:dte bt case ·or emer~ncj 1 ta.nd.inge and other contingenciet.h 
!he airline with government GUPS!"Vtsion muet devise a modern b .• 
s~eetion 91stem and matntenanQe ~lan whereby the o~eration of all aircraft 
csn be accomplished with efttcteney and eatety,. Tbie '.!)\an should lne1.ude 
all facilities, instruments, equi~ments. and airnorts utilized by the air 
carriere. The plan should also insure the constant indoctrination and 
· training of all ~ersonnel on new technological ch~ges as ths,v appear. 
Science is ra~1dly solving the ~robleme incidental to snfe flip)lt. New 
materials, better and more durable. new radio equipment, lighter and more 
lasting, end improved tQo11itiee are constantly being made available. 
Therefore, continuoua sc'hooltng :f.s necessary for the O'Dero.ting, maintenance 
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and g~vernmental personnel involved !n the p~oper use and em~lo~ent 
thereof,. 
A suggested method of determining causes of airc:ra.f't aeeid,ente J The 
m~ causes underlying airplane crashes aressometimes difficult to analyze 
generall;9' because there are never aey survivors to recall the facts that 
bear directly on the accident~ Oauses ha~e to be assumed from the oharr64 
remains of the wreckage. 
AU~ planes should carrr enclosed 1n a shock and fireproof co-ntain.eP 
an tn~trument to record all the planet~ movements and a~~tenanees from 
tak~off to landing. A written record is available for the scientist to 
"; 
stu~ in order to reconstruct the flight~ causes of failure, performance 
enrou.te, and ell p«n-tinent data.t tt necessat7-. 
F!na.lly,··n.teht control needs drastic revision in ·order to contend 
. Wi t1l the ra13id changes incidental to modern air travel. The hozose'9owe:r., 
weight. and speed cbara.cte:dstlee hl'lve 'become so diversified th~t they 
autometica11yt of necessity, divide the aircraft into olsssee. 
There are f'OU!' main sttb-divtslons to be considered commereiallyl 
1" f·~Ul ti"! .. fi,Ored transport ~'17{ th super ... charged motors, p:resmtl"i2Gd. 
·cabins and altitude equi~meat, the 'bu.stness exiontive tY'J)e in 
... 
a. Medium and small twtn.moto:rel t,-pe of lnletness and 'tlleasure flying 
3t< The fast single motoJ~<ed t:tanSJ)ortr and, 
4., !raining and small pleasure t;rpe craft., 
With all e.ircl"att }')l'OT>E~:ttly claasitted. the next stf>J' is to allocate 
to each class separate and. exclusive altitudes for their tndtvidusl. uset 
fo~·J.~:aample. di'V'ided as follows~ sea level to a.ooo teet: a,ooo to 10,000 
teet; 10,000 to 20,000 feett ao,ooo teet and above for the long distance 
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coast t., ·ceast and ilran~ooe~ic air aarrtere. !'he.se eir tr~'"\snorte, 'b7 
d.oing se .• would be abov'~ the weather l:llld oonoe~ently minimhe Bll ha~a.rie 
lu.volv&d 1n IFR flight {instr\itnent tl~e.f..~. rnles), co!liaion enroute, con-
tact with obstacles, a&•. d.hrd'-1is Md the i1tre • 
.A~curat~ t1 ight Gtm.\rola t~ r ~I'OUD.dt ~.11.~ :t"'rom aiM'l~!'tS could be maiA• 
tained at all times: also eU.minlltion of dan~e~:-t incident du!":l.ng inclement 
weather,. dispatch ~f "fast a.irol!'ett ov.ert,ak,.ng olo~.fel!J ·craft enroute,. This 
separation ot air fU.~ts wOttld 't'irtua117 End all eo11hlon and. IJ'R 
troubles. There would be no tfit f'l; i~hts e~•qept 'b3' <J1'.al U'ied. and trained. 
licensed nersonnel. 
Recapi tulat!ng, 'the. n9te the neei.l for th3 :?o11ow~ng:'l 
I. A se-parate Air Satety Boat•! 
U .. New l"''lles and J'egalatloiU.t 
!II. Airlines ooord~uate among themeel~es 
a. Uniform safety meaa\U"eS 
b. S~stem of In ... Flight In~eotton 
CJ. More oonmrehenelve maintewmte and 1>l'Gf1 ight 
d. A continuous educati~na1 pregram fo~ all ~erson~el 
tV. Positive and ~~ld adJudication of all violat~~s~-nrompt nubl1c~ 
tion of' true os.usea of ait"'Dlane craehes-~olude face...aRving re-ports. 
Since its estabU.shement in 19~. the Newark Airport has plqed a 
majo~ role11n the develapment ot air tran~ortatlon and has contributed 
immensely to the eeonomy ct the ~eas adjacent to tt in ~articular, ana 
of' the nation ln general.., l'te sudden closut-e, 'brought about by a sueeessto1 
of tragic accidents. raised a controversial tssuet thatiits ~resent loeatioJ 
constituted a serious hazard to the safe~ and eecurit7 of the ~eonle of 
the neighboring et ties and towns and. therefore, mu.st be closed -permanently 
or moved to another location~ !he gruup that sought the Airport•e closure 
constituted a small minority. ltega.rdless of their nttmber, however, they 
short-lived When the Ai~ort was ordered re.c~ened, notwithstand their 
obJect!. ':'Ins.. 'l*he :re-o-pening was ordered by. the ll'ew York Port Authorities, 
o!)erato-re of the Ai~ort. 
An attemy,t was made in thls -pa'Dta!" to analy2:e and evaluate the methods 
and ~rocedures direct or indirect. ut1ltv.ed 1n the re.opaning, with ita 
attendant problems. involved eo~nom1c and. 'POlitical considerBtio·ns. But 
it also involved as well vital publ1o relations cone:lderations inextricably-
linked with every phase or &J)'1l"'ae.b; t.n the resolutions of the issue. On 
th 19 latter consideration, howevel', lack of awareness and. recognition of 
~blic relations guideposts by the authorities charged with the ~roblem 
of the Ai!'Port*s re.ol)eni:ng is p1ainly visible* 
Xt was shown that tlle nroblem wae &VProached. only from an economic 
and business point of view and not perceived as one replete with situations 
and circumstances that a"Opa.t"ently- needed a. gen.er~e amount of ethical 
e· 
cens:ldera.tione anci human uaereta.ntU.ng., !Jhey tailed. to&, te recogair.e 
to a eollsidettable extent, an inherent Oommurd.t~AirJJort l'e1a.tio:nship en .... 
send;red with the Airport*e establishment .. 

PERIJ.'IBEN'J! PORIJ.tiONS OF TW DOOLITTLE REPORT 
AS tf AFFECTS ftlE· lmWAllK AXRPO~ 
lllstablitmllentr.oft;the Oemmission was an outgrowth of a sequence 
of tragt<t aooide:nts in the New Yo.-k .... Bortheaet Jrew Jerse7 metropolitan 
' ' ' . 
area. ~e faet that these mishaps were oont~ed, b,v ~oinctdence to a 
s1nglecconmm.nity accentuated the feal"s ef ma~ Americans that A.ircra~t 
represent a serious ha2ard to grounU,..dwellers.. '!bey also served to in ... 
crease awareness ot :nuisance aspects tn theuu.ee of airports, 'Part1C'Illarly 
with regard to noise. 
Along with ever~ other vehicle invented and used by modern man. 
a1reraft suffer occasional a~dents wib resulting fatalities to their 
ocC\ll)ant~h More :oately, -pecm.te and opr(')'J)erty on the ~oun~ ~e also in ... 
I • 
volved.. Incidents of'f.th$.s sort are most likely to occur near ait"'Dorts be-
cause o'J)erations Etl"e somewhat JlloJ."e hazat'dou.e• !lit terminals thEP! en route. 
Current !mpre'femeats 1n eq,ut:pment and in o-perational -oroceduree. however, 
offer the possibility that aac14eats of all kinda will 'be fvther reduced. 
Accidents involving aircraft on airw~s and at air terminals should 
eventually :tall well below rates now considered normal tor other f&rms of 
commercial transportation~ 
Many airports are ~roaching saturation~ Some of tnem are badlf 
ou~·of balance dne to deftoienc.r in one or another of their fao1lit1ee. 
For example, eome of our large municinal airnorts now have traffic control 
capabilities permU.ting a great tnQDT landings and take--.of~a "Per hour but 
their runwa?s or servl~ing taellitiee on the ground WPich wert once aW.qnat 
have not kept ~aoe. 
Airport use becomes mor$ eo~11~ated whe~ there is joint use b.1 
td.?11 avla.'bion and the armed serv1ceEh In the inte:t"est of econo!Q' :1. t 
is commQn practice for air defense, mil:tta17 air traneJ)brtation or air-
• . I 
resezove training 'Ol'lite to be based on mun1cil)al. airports~ Combat a!~ 
planes are cenerally no~sy and will probabl;r become noi~ier ·with t}l.e e.Q.... 
vent of more powert¢1 jet types~ Because ~~ th~ noise ot military op~ra­
tions (espeoiall;r on. weekends) e.ni 'bEn~auee aeeidents have occu;rred, 'Deople 
liVing near such airports have comnlained. 
' 'I' . . ' " , 
Joint military- and civtt use ot maJor airports is undesirable. 
Separation should be effeeted;whenever it is economically feasible. 
,, ' ... ' 
. ' 
MiU.taru o-perations over thickly settled regions should l.)e pr~i\i ted,. 
(t(mfi,~t'ft, mJOIIDACBMmtiJ':i: 1 
Another aG'geot of the 'PrOblem deals with the teohnioal and eoonomio 
f'orCJes . whiQh ~re -pressing for a.1rpo:rt exPansion and whte; • in turn are 
GP!'Oeact 'bzr the en~roachment o.f the surrounding communi t7" Meey oomnuni ties 
are ~~oaehing an impasse arietng from limitations to safe operati~ns on 
. ' ' ' 
existing airports. combined with 'Pbvsioall inabiU.ty to improve or extend 
th&m beaa.use homes or fe.oto~ies have been built elose t.o the enda ·of the 
5.'hts .Oomm!seion has ~wo ~stions to make in this connection! 
(l) that C$rtatn extenstons or over-l"Wl t.u.•eas 'be ill<torpo~ated !n the a.i:r-
PO'l"• 1tee1f • and ( 2) that larger al"eas beyond such e$nsions )e zoned by 
proper authority. not only to prevent the erection ot obstructions that 
might be h~ul to aircraft, but also to control the ereotlon of nnblic 
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. ·.tn .. gen!ral, the p!'ogram ealls for financing airport projects on 
a "mat.hinga basis. wtth the federal Government providing grant~1~ald 
to the cam!n1Ulit1es concerened., lJ':rd'oPtunatel}f, this l)rogram has lagged 
because of inabiliti to ~ohrontse the availability of federal and looel 
:tua.e. 
A_solution tom~ aspects of the ai~ort problem is, in the mind 
of the commteston the earlY' aoceptant~e of the single or -parallel runwa;r 
design of airport with approaches over relatively elear areas. !y this 
''uteaaB, airport. development could -proceed along economical linee with 
minimum hazard and annoyance to neighbors. The single or r>a.rallel runwa.Y 
airport has one shortcomin1-diffioult.v of operati~n in strong crosswinds. 
but this is being o~ercome through ~ilot training teohniquee, the uee of 
tri~cle gears and the further devela~ment ot WPeOial crows.wind landing 
Some manufa.ct'tU"Sre suggest that futue trene'Dort -plane!J (derived 
from current lcng•J"amge high ~'need bombers) could be designed to have a 
marked gain in ~erformance and eftio1en~ it ai~orts with runways ~everal 
miles long with olea~. flat a~~roaches of several additional mites at each 
• 
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event'O.t\lly provide at 8400 feet. a length ot 10,000 teet, which should 
. a..-cemodate all types in the foreseeable ftltve. 
rmJSAWQ!. FA9TOR!h 
fhe ~blic cannot be exneeted, howeve~~ to antici~ate technical 
develepments &.nd ....... illhQ'RJ._d l)e _!nfOtmed An,ti nrg,;l~gte~ bf' the responsible 
a.utheritlel!h 'lhe 'f;lUbU!C deservee a clear exnlana-tion of nece$~e.ey airnorot 
-procedures, accompanied b7 'Valid e.ssurancetf that eveeything 'POsei'ble I.e 
being done to ~l~ate 'both noise and he.1aarc1,. i ~ example. in low 
-vtsi'bll.i. tr. incoming aircraft sometimes mu.~t be §tacked up a n-eal' an at.,... 
pol"'t utttl.er precise tratf'le control to t>:tErVent col, is!onEh !he -nublio w:!.ll 
understand and a.cc~t thts necesstt7 if it is assured that, within the 
'.i 
limit ot sate operation. the holding areas are selected so that the stacks 
will not be a source of nuisance., Oneratore, !)llots, and atl"nort controlle2 ~ 
met be tll\\eet:rlna.ted. to con-sider the pec:mle on the gro'UJ1d. and to make eve31'1 
effort oonstste~t with safe flying prs.ctioe to reduce 1ha2ard. and noise. 
Airoraft designelts and manufac~ere must also assume a share of 
the noise a11Erv-iat1on ta$lt.. So fu, they have been concerned ma.1nly with 
noise le"!rels with!n the airplane. 'hey should als~ strive to minimize 
noise outside the a.1:rplane.. lf the manufacturer is given a -penalty for 
du.e to -pilot 91'"1"01" ean be fedueea... "lhe!re is, at the moment. a l"e81"ettable 
lack of uniformity of' ~sign and al"rangement of transnort aircraft cockpits .. 
?ariatione in the same t,rpe, denending on the ideas of individual ei~linea • 
.I useful steJ> in improving the training o:f -pilots in emergency procedures 
w~u, d 'be the standardi~a.tbn and eimplU.'icl'ltion ot eq11ipment in cookpi ts. 
Simplified emergency- procedures l'leturslly •ou14. follow.. !fhe nilot• s Job 
would be easier and safety would be 1ncreaee4. 
More tnlning ·in e)ftergenoy -procedures should be required. 
Simulated e~c;v d:rille in airplanes without -passengers should be 
conducted neriodically.. Such training flights should of cour~e. 'be con-. 
ducted over 'blnha'bite4 areas. A method of ·training orews without hazard 
is through the use of flight simulators. These are complicated devices 
du1)1icat1ng the cockpit and flight decks of the airplane.: 'Rbe flqt:ti!)ment: 
and instPnmentation are operated b,v an i~tructor to simulate TBrious 
emeFgeney conditions.~ The ct"ew then deale .with the situation e.s it would 
in flight. Neces~;~ary 1}ract:ice is thus vrovid.ed without risk. Since flight 
sbmlators are eXpensive tor e:<>ch type of aircrAft, it mey be necessary 
to purchase and use them on a cooperative basis. 
Seotloa 3t UOO~A'P.ION'Sf 
1. Support reqn1red for ai~ort development. New Airports will be needed 
and -p:~esent airports must 'be improved.. State, connt:ry and munict..,al 
gove:fm.ments shoull be ~repared to assume the1J> -prope:r share of this ex,ense. 
a.. Expand Federal•Aid,..Ait'Port Prog2:'6m, Authorization of matching f\mds 
f'ol' Federal Ata. to a.irparts should be implemented by ad•quate a~rO])l"ia­
tions.. Righut pttiorUy ·in the .a.pnlioation of F-ederal aid should be 
given to runways and their protecM.ve extensions incorporated inta the 
liit'Por'b, to \iring me.joi" rnuniciT)al ail"Ports U1' to standards recommended tn 
thls 3l'eport. 
s. lategrate mu:nla!:pal. and ait"pO:Pt nlann1ng,. A:tt"l'orts should. be made a 
_ .. ,~ 
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~art of com~tt,y master nlane. completely inte~ated wttb transportation 
lar attention should be paid to limited acc!ss h1ghw~e and other trans• 
portation faCilities to ~duce time to the airport from sourcea of air 
transportation business~ 
4. Inco!"Porate cleared runwa.v extension areas 1.nto airports.. The dominant 
l"'tlnwaye of new airport 'Proje6ts etumld be projected by cleared extensions 
at each end e.t least ~ miles in length and lQOO feet wtde, This area 
··should be oompletel;r free from housing or an.v other form ot obstruction .. 
Such extensions should be considered an integral ~art of the airnort. 
5.. Establish effective soning laws~ A fan-Shn~ed zone, beyond the ~ mile 
cleared. extension described in Recommendation 4, at least two miles long 
and 6000 teet wide at ita outer limits ShOUld be established at new sir• 
~orte 'by moning law, air easement o~ land purchase at each end o¥ dorninat~ 
runways. In this area, the hhf.ghit of buildings and also the nee of the 
land shoUld be cont~olled to eliminate the erection of nlacee of public 
assembly, churches-. hoe-pitals, schools and the like, and to restrict 
residences to more distant locations within the zone. 
a. lftrPII'oVe existing ai!"llorte.. llbd.it1ng airpo!*ts mu.et continue to se!'Ve 
their communities. However, cities whould go as far as possible toward 
tieveloplng the cleared areas and zoned J'W'J.WSW a'!)nroaches recommended for 
new ait"poJOts. No f'lll"ther building should be permitted on ru.., extensions 
ancl wheretrVer possible. obJectionable strv.etves should be removed,. 
Operating prooe~es should be modified in line with Oommission recommenda-
tions for minlmi?.iDg hazard and nuisance to persons living innthe vioinit, 
of such airports. 
'1. Ol.asolfy laws and regulations governing use of aitos"Dace. Authori tv ftf' 
the Federal. State, or mun1eiyal governments wt th J<espect to the soegula\S.on 
of the uae Qf airspace should be clarified to avo14 contlicting laws and 
regulations. ' f., 
· .. 
! 
CtvU ··. Aeronautics Act should be amended to requi:re cel'Mfiontion of a.i~ 
ports neceeeaey tor intersta:te commerce and. to specify the tel'l!la and 
conditions under which airports so certitted shall ba «>pexoa.ted. Oertit1oat s 
should. be revoked 1f minimum· standards tor safety ere not maintained. 
Closing or abandonment of e.n air-potot should 'be ordered or allowed only it 
clearly 1n the pu.bltc interest~ 
10 .. · r~ainta!n posit~ve air traffic cont~l. Certain air traffic control 
~ones . i!l areas of high ®nslty a.tr tt'aff.ic shO\lld 'be made the eub3ect ot 
specia1 11'6galations to insut"e that al1 aircraft within the zone are und.el' 
'otlsit1:Ye air traffic control at all times JJegardlees of weather.· 
11.. Raise circling .and maneuvering mtaimwne. Present etstght ... tn 
lnstrwnent approach minimwns are. coJu.d.d.ered sa.UstnetorJ' but the minimum 
oei11ngs and rlsibilittes under which aircraft are permi ttetl to cil'cle 
lB. Accelerate insta11a.tlon ot aida to air ne.v!.gatton. !eseareh and 
development programs and installation ~rejects designed to imp~ove aids to 
navlcation and traffic control tn the ~icinity of ai~orte~ e~$e1a117 .~ 
congested ~reas. should be accelerated. tn~tallatlon and ad•quate manning 
of radar tra.ffto control syst-ems should be given high pttiori ty. 
-. ?4--
lS. Revis& present cross-wind component limits. F«isting croes•wlnd 
uom:ponent limitations should 'be s-eviewed to establish more liberal cross.. 
' ' ' ' 
wind landing and tak&o+off. specu·tea.ttons for each t:ranSJ>ort-..tY'l')e aircraft. 
• 14. Develop and uae cros~wind eqtd.:pme~t,. Al tb6ugl\ modern tranS!)ort. ai•• 
erM't 41a.n operate successMly tn ant but, v--ery et,.-ong orosg,.,.winds • th$ 
f'vther development and use of emeci$1 crosS4win~ landing gears should be 
accel~a.ted.., 
llh Extend use of single l'Ul\Way system. New airports should ado'Pt a 
stnsle ~1" pafl\llel 1'1mW&T design. ~is should be adequate ~xee-pt under 
stl"Gng wind. conditions. in which caae a shorter runwq at 90 degrees to 
the main one may be required, Present air~orts should ~lan to ~evelo~ 
the- 4()mi:r.v.tte nnway at the expense of those l.ess used. A!f"'ort expansion 
should 'be achieved throug)l additional -p~a.llel rtln~s· 
16. Meet sta.nilard l"equi.remente for l"'IUlway length. Fo~ each catego27 of 
&is-port a standard runway l:ength ha.s ·been established consistent with its 
future pla!U'i.ed use* Attmorts should 'bring their runwa;vs up to the standard 
For intercontinental or transooattnental ai~orts. the length ot the 
dominant runways sb012;ld 'b~ 8400 teet with 'Posstb1llt7 of &X!'JBD.sion to 
10.000 teet tf later required with el~tU> a'Q1>ttoaehes as 'Per recommendations . 
4 and 5,. 
1?. Acoelel"ate ground. noise red'Uctlon -progrannh Engine rul). ... u-p schedules 
and rurJ..oo.® locations .should 'be adjusted to minimize noise nEk"-1' airnorts. 
Adequate aeoustical tre.atment ln run .... up 'ltrea:s and at test stands should 
• be provided. 
18., Instruct flight personnel concerning nuisance factors.. A tight 
discipline with res~ect to airnort a~~roach and de~arture nroceedures to 
.· r. ·~.' •' . 
minimb:e noise to -peo'!)le on the ground (within the limits of safe o-perating 
procedures) should be maintained at all times.-
19.. Azorange flight pattexonf;! to reduce ground noise.. .Airwa;vs and flight 
T>attems near airports should be arranged to avoid uaneeessa:rr flight over 
thickly settled areas to minimize noise, but onl7 within the limits of 
safe flight ~Jtactice. 
ro. Minimize training flights at conge~ted airoorts. flight czoew tnintn 
should be con~ctel. as tar a~ Praotieablet away from thickly settled 
' ;. . . ' . . . ' / ' . 
ueae and wit!l a minimum number of tlights into and out of buoy airports~ 
21. Mintmiee test f'l1ghte near metropolitan areas. Production flyaway 
from aircraft factories under -pro~er conditions is aocenta.ble btlt all 
flights of eroerimental: aircraft and ilest flying of production modele 
near bui.lt-un areas should 'be reduced as tar as -nosd'ble. 
22. Avoid mUit~ training over coxigeeted areas. Although the basing of 
reserve air units at ait"J)orts neAr cities has been consider~d generally 
desirable, and the location ot certain combat unite there is sometimes 
necessary. training maneuvers. pnrtioularly with armed militaF,V aircraft. 
should be conducted only over open spaces. L"nid shuttle service to an 
outlring·mtlitar.v training field ot~ers minimum interference with civil 
air operations and maximum safety and freedom from nuisance to ~eonle on 
the ground. 
23. Se~arate military and civil flying at oongePted airnorte. Mtlltar,v 
aircraft should not be based on conge~ted civtl a1r~nrts e~cept when it 
i• not eeonomical11 or otherwise feasible to ~rovide separate facilities 
for them nor sho•.lld cilunmercial aircraft Ol!)e:rate regularly from busy militar 
airports. 
24; Provide more fl f.ght t,~e.ini~, Ever:T fl'itht ~er~w should. be requ.1re4 
to have trel.\_uent 4rills ln e~~t'gen~ and :instNment 'PI"Ocedu.res. Whis can 
be a.eoo!UPlished. in 1'H11't ·in tlight s!mula.tore.. IJ!hese fiight simulators 
should 'be located. at. convenient -points and should 'be a~a.ita'ble to all 
opel"atol's on a faS.r basts. 
25. Develo:P hel ico:pters for c1vi1- ·use. Concnrrent with mil itat"Y hsli• 
. . 
copter devel0pment, interested government agencies shoutd. ·encourage civil 
helicopter development to'lt lnte;-... a,irport shuttle services, and. for short .... 
haul USEh &fll"'\ba.shlng safet~, r8l.iab!llty, and. public .tplera'bif)n factors .. 
Part It AVtATION~·A Nattonal'Asaet 
In the sho!'t span .ol: ftf·tor years since the· invention of the air ... 
-plane, aviation hiSI.s' 'beco~e essential to our ~tlefense and 1a4ie-pen-sa'b1e to . 
oar national e.coao~. _Ali!hough onlv a fraction of ov.total 'PO'Pulation 
ie directly ~ged in· the 4eaign, manuf"actute or O"De:'ation of aircraft • 
. ' . . '•' ' .· ' 
. . 
eV&f!8' oithen is sa lttd.i~et.'b~ef'i~ta:lay .. _ 
United States airlines· last year did a}roroximatel;v $"17a,ooo.ooo 
. . 
-nerson$ now w$:rk for the alrU:nes of this co\ll'lt17,. '!he· 'W.siness ot air 
trUs'Do:l'tatton 1$. spread: ov~ ell -p~rts c.f the United States and_ eontri'butea 
·'. · to the welfare of ma• cotllll'nmitiea • 
. But in ~lte Of reJDQrka.ble :pl"~gress in the 'f)!"lSt fifty )"Sal"S 1 it 
must be remembered that air trans~orta.tion is stlll in an early stage of 
develcmm.ant. Other transpot'tat1on systems, on land and sea., have many years 
of' experience behind. them. Mod.Q'll air ~eporta.tio11 is new to this 
generation. 
Part III 
·section 1. A1JI13o~t ebaraoteJOistl$s and the ail'port 
While alz-por\s cannot 'be •tad.ed .every time a new transport -plane is pro-
posed, progress tn the aeronautical field ~~t be aaticl~ated br the at~ 
poift designer to provide necesaa:l'? margins against earl$ o'bsolescenee, 
'l'he landing speed of an airplane is o.f. 'P:tlmai?' !mpoittsmce in detet-mintng 
. . ~ 
the l"UnWf.IY length ueed.ed fa-r its aate olleratioa. This f!'Peeci ie eloaely 
assaoia.ted with the alrplane1 s maximum speed anA cru.1sing speed. 
While the siee and weight of the airplane have no specttle bearing on the 
ove:r:-all s1»e of the a.il'fJort, thw do not aff'eet the i'equired strength of 
a1~o:r:t rlinways. tu1wa.vs. a-prons, and their widths and. space requ.tremen'lf. 
franaport airplanes have shown a proaouneed an4. eteadJ increase tn size 
wf.th time... Development et imp.roved stn.ctual teolmiques, materials, ana. 
opowe~ plants baa ma.di this tnerease J)Ossi'ble. but the actual size at a~ 
e:..s _time has been cUctated largely b$r eeo21.omic contdders.ttons, such as load 
potent1$le. operating ctCHlfts. and trt-p freqUency req_uit-ements. Such con-
siderations,, ~· it difftw t to ma.lte':~ timed. pred.tetinn of! abe. 
>1, ' t • ' 
No airport ext~ts by itself., and the uset'Ulneas of $a<;h depends Ul)on the 
qaality of Us nelgh'bol"s" FuciamenW to Vnlteti States* transportation is 
. . 
a well~intagrated ~stem of airports whiCh p~de adeqU$te facilities both 
at original aad destination points. 
To t'ormulate su.eh a system it is necessary to (l). detemine -p:t-esent and 
fu~a airport needs ft.tl"' all types of oemmutd.Ues and various air o-neratibnsi 
e (2) eYal:ua.te e:dsting tacUit1est and (3) to :propoae such additional 
f'aeilttifas as may 'be needed to safeguard l:raman 1 if'e.-'both in the air and on 
~SIGN ANn _OgJI!RrrCTIO~ 
!'!lU&tm~ FolU:' tacte:l"s gove:r.n runwe7 ecnstw.obion. ... lengfth' width. grad.es, 
and etl"ength. Ot these:. l"W'l\V8Y length ie of tbe gxoeatest concern in ail"-' 
• 't)Ort planning"' 
'J.$£f.!N{fh iunwa;rs tlhould be utted by airoraf"t o:nly b. takeoffs and landings. 
lt is essential to he.ye well designed taleiways. so that the ai:rcrtrl"t can 
expedi t.ioualy move from Ol" to ~wsys• load:l.~ and servicing areas. and 
ll.sngar and storage areas~ 
!lm'""!"! f:J?Nng. Betwee!l each :t!'l.mW$7 :&Xtd and the tax1wqa. t'Wt-up a-p:rons a~e 
, t)taft'1c on tlie partioul.ar ~ .. 
. . ' ~ 
f!ll.idaJlo-i• PUota should be· '!)l"OVided with l)I'O'pSl*' routes of -tx>avel from ol" 
to a run~ and with gtddance !ndida;tlors each as taxiW"ly lights. ~o reduce 
radio talk between the ~11ot and traffic oontroller. signs rea&able both 
dq and ni~t shoulcl 'be installed along the !'lmwq to iruticate tum•ott 
points and ·destination AJ'eas.. tlhe runwa;rs should be marked 'b3r a. u1form 
and well.detlned pattern, of dlsttncUve sha-pe and colo:>; painted on the 
~aved surfaces. !ne 'Pattern should \& of composition that ta readily di~ 
oernible to a pilot '\l'!'On touchdown. infoming him of his 1ooat1on and nro-
'\tlcUng a luther 8Q.1de to :rra:rn.-.oft> ~oints~ 'l'hte is 1,lartioularl;r important 
on long runwavs and unde~ conditione of low visibility* High intensity 
;; a-pp~aeh lights with variable 'brightness control are of value under adverse 
weather conditione. 
§~o~~-on I~t ~he Wohe ny._isance. 
Whlle airports are 'Vital assets Gf the communities they set"Ve and of the 
na.tlon~as a. whole. 'they can. also be a nuisance to the peoJ)le who live near 
them. !he prtnoipaJ ·m.d:sanoe taot~r is netae. As the fre·qU~nev ot n~t 
. 
and. the pow~ ot the alrplane have lnoreaseft.t adv.,se Public reaction to 
the noise' nu.taanne .has 'been ~!t'~~sed •. low that nlOSt IJlajO.l' 'airPO~ts. oriae. 
' ' ' . . . "" " . 
remoi~ . t:rom vban centers, have "'beeome tml"l"oluided bt realdenttal earea~. 
:tt ls lnrparatlve that e..tfe:r·ts 1Hl made to p~teveat twtther inoreasf) in a.i,.,.. 
o:raft noise. and wher.~ 'POss.i'ble to :reduce current noise l.e'tela" 
; .·.· 
fhe sotU"ca ot o'bJeotlona'ble .uoise in the netghborhoo~ of a.irpo:ttts 
• • t • 
.,. 
e~. be :PU.ti l:ato two ge:ae~ eateogJties, (1) $lee as!ooiated with ground 
. . ' . "' . ' 
op•)t~t:lons ot a1rc:raft. aact { 2) .. noise of tltght ope~ations. .0~ a~or ts 
a4J,uel1t ta aircraft mau'O.factuJ:o1ng -plants. and on those having lat"ge 
. '··:'. ,.,... r· . l •• 
~ttu.~~ matnte:nanot> .aad ove~ha.ul shops. coneidei"s.'bl.e noise is geners.t.ed. 
'''>',· 
ba'r1ihe l!'Unhlng Of' $lgines UJ. .test stands.+. 
StQt~.~&~" b!tvWJ~Vf!!s ttf.lllftk · 
Abs¢~htiie safety to1! th~ indJ:d.dw. is an ideal which has we~ been 
:. ,' 
s~t but 11e¥er a:'btai:tu~a... Because man does not ha-ve Ml acntr~1 o1rer 
' • ' ' ' ' ' I • ' ' ,· 
!lis. envi!'onment. the ver:? function of .li"Ving has il:lherent haaards which 
;. • • ' ' ' • t ' ' • 
bet,tome more pronc•ced s.s the scheme ot 1 iving ~oQ mor-e. complex.. ~us, · 




... oonstant17 stli'Uggl ing to X"edu.oe the :dsks which oauss accidents, . 
~ . . 
the "t'ectple of' this connt!r'T en,Jo7 a high depee of tnii'rid.ual ~ty. ~e .· 
t'!$lid in total aceidental W:tath r-ates is a.own.wat4• .Llative safety., thJtt'e.. 
fo~, has ·lnc"asel. '(See pages 49 ... 54) 
fJ.t' 'f.Y t !Jte iAt.no£1! AI P-. ,J,fat~oni! P~:oilem. 
s,ctie;. ~· Spmi·mechfR!.t_e). .i\!a. humy fytpst&--tn the f'in~ analzrste. th& 
.. 
di1'1'ct fiovces of ha.ra&Jiii ta 'Jli1JOl)le on the ~ttnd are the airplane and 
. the crew who flt it.. It one or the other fails. a. crash m9Y'ttesu.lt· ... _ •. 
~th11'4g• therefore. ·that I'IUlkes the maChine more 2t$liable• or the crew 
' 
less subJeot to £allures con~tbutes to _the safety bt ~eople on the 
PO~ a good m~ years aviation has been a carefUlly regul~ted 
'buetneruH feW~ 1f at~Ut industries :function 'O.Xlder such stringent laws 
and. inf:TPeutton ~ systems, ·Oertairtl'7 n~ other transportation medium is 
e.o oompl$t~Y. ~~ervlsed •. ~he potential danger to ~aesengere in at~ 
planes 'Pl"GVided eut'f1oleat stimulus to create this !'ll)gula.tion. · · 
!he airplane designer cannot dissociate himeelt from the problem .. 
'Be is• after allt the oreato:v of the ~io half ot the airnlane...ai!'lo!o .. 
-port oombiastion. As the att"pla.ne be<;!ilmee more nearly "f:ool .... p~o:t8 
eve~ne will benefit. 
One lnxportant design objective is to minimlae the effect ot 
possible mechan!oal fail'tU'~s.. A short circuit in the p:ropeller control, 
toJt e:Jtalm.)le, mnst not start a oha.1n ~ea.otton which will reeul t in the 
p~eller sudd&n11 reTel"sing in tltght.. Designel's must anttot-nat~ the 
results ot failure ot an, system o~ eomponent part and must ~rovlde for 
. . . . ' ' ' . ~ . . . 
e~h cont!ngeney b. a wa:y that will not t'}eo-pardise the a1rcratt:s ability 
to e~ntinue tltgh\. this is known as the '*tail ... aafe8 theo:ry ot design, 
and subjected to etl"S.ngent medical examinations.. 'l'h1s is particul~ly 
true of the pilot who is both airplane capta!tt and the man at the oontrole. 
Hie two most important .qua11f1catif\ns ~Jre professional oomnetence and 
, 
"""'.....,ent. Lack of ei the!" eha.l"aoteritrtlo in a pilot could. lead to serious 
Professional competence 1n a transpot"t t'ilc>t is a. detir¢'b1~e com. 
binat1on of me.ng thiJSgst kno\l1ledg$ of the ail"plane ltaelft .ntghly developed 
flying ab:tllty; good oooJ.i'c11na1r!ont eJ;celltmt eyesight, good heartngv and 
' 
generally good health. Ju.4gment., on the othet" hand. is an intangible, A 
pilot acquires ~d.gment !n db'eet ratio to his erperienee. All th!nge 
being equal, the elder the pilot, the better his judgment. mhts build..,.. 
up continues for many :rea.rth tnttrnatel:r, how~ert a point will be reached 
wheJOe age slowe a ptlo\' $ ~etlexes and lu~gins to offset his accumulated 
~e:rienoe and Ju~ent. 
NA!rtONAL AtR TllAltSPORT COO'R!lltlAT!ITG CO~mXfll"EE 
ElGST POINt t'ROGIW·! 
Bemo'Vld ·ttl ell traitd.ng fllghta f't;oom Newark Airnort excer>t qual!-. 
ttcation flights :r&quf.•ed at the e.itmort by the O!'I!U Aeronauttei·Admintstf~ 
ttoa regulations. 
Maintenanee of at least t.aoo feet of altitude near the airport 
fo~ as leng as possible betore starting to land. 
Attainment of l.,aoo teet of eltttua.e by all aircraft' as soon ae 
possible after leaving the runwa.,vs an& 'before making turns toward thei%' 
deetinationth 
c,n&let ot greund engine l"l1Jl<oou:ps, except fer pre.tak~otf run-Ul)s, 
1n areas specit!oal.ly designated by the Pon Authct-ity. to reduce noise 
annoyance. 
Installation of twc.wsv recording equipment 111 the Newark Airport 
Oonttt$1 !lowell'. 
lfottfieation of all <pilots using the ab?>ort to comply with all 
ot these l\Tewark M.rpor-t px-ucedures. 
CJ!he ttpreterence run~ u.sag.e qatemu will be in effect e.t all 
times wb.ea wind. velocities aPe not more than 15 mlles en hour 81\d the wtn6. 
is blowing from a ~oint not SXdeeding SO de~~eee of the direction of the 
runway in use. and when there is 1,000 feet 'betwen the clouds and the 
pound and three miles vis:tbil1t,--. lt ie estimated that these conditione 
p~eva!l ove~ 85~ of the time on a 7early basis. ·nnaer this s~st~. pilots 
are advised by the control towel' whtch rn:nwe;r to use in ordel" t<> m1nimh:e 
take-offs and landings over -por,Jutated. areas. ".t'he qstem has been success-
.... 82• 
tully instelled at LaGna.t!'dia end JT~w York l:nteJ~nattonal Ait'Ports but has 
neYer been fully operati?e at Newark-
The Newark Atrpo:rt runways are designated as Runw~-7 10..28 and Bun~ 
WPJ'1/ 4-22 (new Bunwq flJ.t•)., The aumws show. the compass headings r4 the 
runwa.v ends, Bunwe7 1&28 is the east-west ~way at the field. Ita 
easterly end is a.U.gned toward Newal"k :lq with its westerly end toward th~t~ 
Weequahic section ot Wewark. 
RunwiA;r 4o.-2S .is the north ... eouth I'Ul\wq. Its southerly end is in 
the direction of tni~a'beth~O:r't ~t\h~ .~twwav kn,Own as A7f~ Rill.. Xte 
northerly end .h aligned towt\l'd. the I£~ .Meadowl;t. 
the. mdu.steyte -prefer.ee system has as 1ts. aim a 1!ldimom ~umber: 
of landings and ta.te-ofte GVer Kearny Meadows and a mi:n!mum numbe!' of 
iand:ings and tak:e ... offs eve:r Weeq:nahic and lilli~allethport. 
lTnder the epstem, first eholoe fe'IJ landings will be el ther Runwa..v 
22 direeting airoraft over the Kearne,r Meaiowa, or BQnw~ 28 directing 
a.ii'OJ!'aft OVEit' Newarit ~~. !he next ohoite for landings at Bet<1&l'k will be 
~ 4, direeting aireraft over A~thur K~ll and Elte~betbpart. 
Last choice for land.tnga will 'be 'ltmwau 10 directing aircraft ovel' 
Weequahtc Park. 
!1irst choft) e toJr take•off~ a\ lfewark rill be eitheJ> 'RunWSJ' 10 
a.uect1ng atruaft over BewaJ"k :Bay, Ol" :B.u.nwq 4 dtJ~eoting a1rora:f't over 
~al"ne,. Mea.d&ws. '!he :nextl Ghot.oe for take..offe will be Runwq 23 d.treot1ng 
ai!fl~t over the Arthur Kill and Eltaabetb;port. 
taet choice for take~ofts wtll be aun~ 28 directing aircraft over 
Weequahio Park .. 
~e tnt\ustrr C<tmmltt$6 a!'!l!Jhast.aed that the use of the l')rete:rence 
runw~ system conrplet.e'lzr d~ends u:oon the &.irection and stre11gth of the 
wind. Beca:u.se of this fact., aberaft ta.td.ng off and. landing will not 
avoid every community near the airport at all ttmeg. But, when wind conli· 
tiona ~d weather pet>m1tt the sYstem will result tn ail"C)raft lending and. 
taking off over Newarlc Dav and over the Kearney Meadows. 
!.'he govet'nment :requires e~ch airlines '!)11ct to make perlod1o 
flights to prove that bit\ cennpetence to fly ts being maintained. It. is 
the -pl'aetice of all airlines to require ad.d:tttonal .,eri~dical. co~tenc:r 
fllghte 'by each of its ptlots, In eaoess ot: those ~reeorfbed by Federal 
Regulations. Normally, ~i of thee• co:1n9ete,noy fligh'ts to'!: ~Uote based 
at lfewark wo'tild. be (lendu.o\ed a.t Newark A1~or:th U'~der the Jf.A,T.C.o .. nlant 
the, have l)een tranafetred to other loee;,ions. or are conducted in gl'Ound 
min!Jlg dev!oith '.rb.er_efore, the only training flighte at Bewar:k Airpo:rt 
will be those few flights necessar.r to qaalif~ a pilot g~igin~llt into the 
ail'PO!"t. At the time the airport el,oeedr more than SOO tt-ain.ing flights 
a month wd'e being conducted there. 
Ais"e:rflft malting eircU.ng a~-proaobes are '!"equ.tred to enter the 
traffic patten e.t Newark at a. mt.nlm.u.m altitude of 1,.200 feet. PrevtoU:ely. 
thel!e wae no J~estriction a.s to when the airOI'aft eould then descend to 
lower altitudes. 'Under the n • .a.t. 0~0., -pJ.I'aaedve. all aircraft must ma.tl"J.-
• 
··95 ... 
tain 11 200 teet of altitude until the r>erfo~ce eharactel'iet1os of the 
a!Jtoratt reo.,lire that the final descent begin,. !he sp..me proceaure an1'U.ea 
to aircraft flying st~aight-in to the atrnort without oir~ling~ 
Departing e.l"craft e.re now required to a.ttatn 11200 feet of a.ltitudt 
as soon as -possible after talte-.off and 'before turning on course toward. 
their destination. Pr~iously. there wae no requirement to ~revent de-
~art~ aircraft from flYing at low altitudes for relati~ely long distances 
after leaving the runwaus, or e:eettting low~level turne toward their destiru~ 
tions .. 
re~oed low flying over communities near ta&uardia. and New York Internation1~ 
At:t-portth 
It had previously been the ~raotice $t Newark to conduct ~und 
engine :run ... Ul'ls on 'V"1!Lrioue Pa-rts of the airport... il'be rwt•U'PS ·are necesea1"1 
to i:nsw.'e high standard$ of all maintenance wot-k. Under the new nlmlt · 
the Port of New York Au.thori t1 w11.1 designate a.reae for these ~ ... ups. to 
avoid. noise annorance to nearby ccmmuntties" In the inter~ets of flight 
safety, the eommtttee pointed out, howeve~, that it 1s necessary thet p~· 
tlle)lt run, ... u;pe (those e.tond.ueted lmmecUatel~ !)t'"iO!' to take.off) 'be cont1n't.\ed 
to be made at the end of the departure run~. 
!WO""'t1AY aEOORDlNG EQ.U:tPMlllNT 
l:his permits aoO'Ilra.te assessment of a.troraft traf'fic control 
5-ef:tteiency by the rev1ew of all comnn.mice.tions 'between r>tlots anutthe tower 
a.ad from the tot·1f1>r to aircraft.. In the -past eueh stud;r was i!'l\!)ossf.ble be· 
cause onl)' towe,....to ... a1rcratt eomlmlllicat1ons were recorded. {fbe new equ.1'D-
-~ ' ... · 1 ~ 
D!.stri.bu.tton of 1nfcnrrnatlon on the new Newark r>1an stat-ted laot 
~ek with thousands of mailings t~ougbout the country. In addition, the 
operations depe.J>tments ot all majol" airlines are posting the Newark -pro• 
eed.ur$s on 'bulletin boa!;'d.a and taking other steps to ins-ve that they reach 
every pilot using Newark Atrpot. Alao, the Air Line Pilots As.soc1at1on attd 
::_ii:; 
the Port of New York Autborit.y ar& c1roalaris!ng other groups of in4iv!~ 
equipped with awraoeh ra.dal", gttde sco-pe and nnwq looa1i~er, high in ... 
tensity a:o~roaQh lights, eonma.ss locators. high trequeney radio markerth 
. . . . 
and 1ihe most modern tTPe high 1ntenstt7 l!'UD.Wt:W" lights and marldngsjlo 
\'he National Air mraxurport Coordina.tin~ Committee., with Cap~ln 
~ •. . 
E. V., RS.Gkenb&oker. "Pi"&aiient and general manager of Eastern. Air Lines. as 
' 
6rd.rman, is eomprised oft Ai&t 'Prans~ol't Association of Amertcat Aircraft 
Industr-ies Assce:iation of' America. Inc. a Air Coa.ch frane'POrt Association.; 
Inc., Air Line Pilots Association, Int~a.tional; Aircxoaft Dwnera aud Pllots 
Associat1onr Civil Aeronautics A&ntnist1"aU.on; Oorpol'ation Aircraft Owners 
Assoeiation, Inc.: indey,endent Military Air lfrans~o1"t Association. and the 






NEWARK APPROACH CONTROL 
341 126.5 126.18 
= 
Cons ult rad io f.:tci li ty ch arts 
for l atest in formation 
PROCEDURE TURN 
East s id e SW cours e 1500 w it hin 
4 .3 ( 5.0 ) mi les of LOM . 
MINIMUM SAFE ALTITUDES 
100 Nautical Miles 6300 
25 Nautical Miles2600 
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NEWARK LOCALIZER NEWARK TOWER ELEV 






MI SSED APPROAC H 
CLIMB TO 1000 ON NE COURSE ILS, MAKE CLIMBING 
LEFT TURN, CLI M B TO 2000 ON DIRECT COURSE TO 
PATERSON RBN, OR AS DIRECTED BY ATC, if not 
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Glid e path inte rcept ion a lt itu de: 1500 




THE NEWARK AIRPORT-~1.AYORS 1 COIDUTTEE 
cl o Mayor Nicholas Syl vaster La Corte 
City Hall 
Elizabeth, Ne"' Jersey 
HELP YOUR OF.FICI.ALS RELIEVE A PLAGUE 
Please answer the following questions, YES or NO 
Does the noise from low-flving planes 
(al Interfere with the normal ~eace of mind of yourself end 
other members of your family? 
(b) Does it dusturb the sleep of yourself and other members 
of your family? 
(c) Does it affect the health of yourself and other members 




Please furnish the following information concerning low-flying ulanes 
-between December 22, 1952, and January 3, 1953 
Date and Exact 
or Approximate 
Time 





I cannot auproximate as to the exact time and height of the 
planes breaking violations • Of most concern to me and my 
f~amily are flights on evening and night schedules. Some are 
so low that it is emotio~ally shocking. The aftermath of its 
vibrations has a sleep deterring effect. 
Name ••••••• ~roo~OmaA.Maieraa •••••••• o••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Address ••.•• 205.Erie.Street ••••••...•.••...•.•••••..••.•.••• ·-··••o• 
No. in Family •• 2 •• No. of Adults •• 2 •••••• Ages of Children •••••••••••• 
Please mail to me. Postage is urepaid. 
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Francis 0,. Orowley 
Graduate 
!oeton College Pre~Eonton College. Mass. 
Air Foree Engineering School, D~ton, Ohio 
Air Force Photoge:ohio School. !a.ntoul. UU.nois 
M.I.T. Gound School, !aston, Mass. 
u.s .• Atr Force Flying Schools 
Pilo"" ... Wottld. War I and ti 
Present rank .... Oolonet,l1SA1i'R 
!atiug-Oommand Pilot, ~eahnlcal Obeervor, 
Green Instrument Gard 
MemberJ Aircraft Accident ~oards (Pres* Empi~e 
State Crash Inquiry »oa.rd) 
Mas~adhusetts Aeronautics Oommlssion 
Royal Air Force Personnel IJ.'ra.nsf'er Board 
Newspaperman • s American Legion Post 
Aero Club, Massachusetts 
Josto·n ... 'N'ew York Night Airmail Pilot 1929 
Log 'Time,;..over 101000 hours of all types, single 
and mu1 tt...enginea. air.craft 
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commanding officer in the United States and Great 
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Air Inspecto~Deputy for Engineerin~Staft Member 
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